

Can (and Should) Judges Be Shamed?

Evidence from the “Six-Month List”

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Abstract

Recent court reform efforts in the United States have focused on speeding up what is perceived to be a slow and burdensome federal civil justice system. But how is speed best achieved, and at what cost to other goals of the civil justice system? I study a Congressionally-enacted reform known as the “six-month list,” which uses social pressure to incentivize federal judges to decide cases more quickly. After constructing an original dataset of nearly 500,000 federal district court motions—representing the approximate universe of summary judgment motions in federal civil cases for the period 2004-2014—I exploit quasi-random variation in exposure to the six-month list in order to answer two related questions. First, does the six-month list accomplish its ostensible goal of promoting speedier adjudications? And second, how does the six-month list affect the quality of civil adjudications? Preliminary results indicate that the six-month list does indeed improve speed; the summary judgment motions that are most exposed to the six-month list are resolved almost a full month (15%) faster than those that are least exposed, and overall case durations are similarly impacted. I also find considerable heterogeneity across judges, with judges who are young, non-white, or female being among the most responsive to the incentives created by the six-month list. Speedier adjudications notwithstanding, I find only mixed evidence of effects on the quality of adjudications. My results suggest that—at least among federal judges—social pressure can be an effective substitute for monetary incentives. I interpret these results as consistent with a model of judicial behavior that combines elements of career concerns, procrastination, and multitasking.

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1 Introduction

Recent court reform efforts in the United States have focused on speeding up what is perceived to be a slow and burdensome federal civil justice system. But how is speed best achieved, and at what cost to other goals of the civil justice system? This paper offers one of the first empirical analyses of a civil justice reform initiative, known colloquially as the “six-month list,” that uses social sanctions to incentivize judges to prioritize faster adjudications. This paper poses two questions. First, can social sanctions be an effective means of promoting judicial efficiency? And second, when court reform efforts put speed first, how, if at all, does that affect the *quality* of adjudications?

Article III federal judges enjoy life tenure and protected salaries, but that does not mean they are above reproach. In March 2017 then Chief Judge Louis Guirola of the United States District Court for the District of Southern Mississippi took the extraordinary step of temporarily relieving a fellow district judge from taking on new civil cases. Citing a backlog of more than fifty motions pending six months or more and twenty-four cases pending three years or more, the Chief Judge ordered that all new cases initially slated for his lagging colleague be reassigned to one of the court’s senior judges.¹ This came after repeated admonishments from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.² If the federal district judge in Mississippi represents one extreme, then at the other extreme we might find one California superior court judge who, in a 2009 employment discrimination case, granted the defendant’s 1,056-page motion for summary judgment without, apparently, reading it.³

The above examples demonstrate two intuitions that most of us share about our justice system, both of which are so obvious as to typically go unstated. First, justice should be speedy. And second, if the process is *too* speedy, we begin to worry whether justice has truly been delivered. These examples also serve as a reminder that judges—especially U.S. federal judges—are accustomed to their independence, and they are not easily incentivized.

¹Jimmie E. Gates, *Judge Wingate still barred from handling new cases*, THE CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 17, 2017, available at <https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2017/10/17/judge-wingate-still-barred-handling-new-cases/771901001/>.

²R.L. Nave, *Justice Delayed?*, JACKSON FREE PRESS, July 17, 2013, available at <http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2013/jul/17/justice-delayed/>.

³*Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.*, 178 Cal. App. 4th 243, 289 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“[W]hat apparently happened,” according to the majority opinion of a panel of California’s First District Court of Appeal, “is that the trial court did not read all the papers.” Despite reversal, the appellate court seemed to show a degree of sympathy for their lower-court colleague: “While not reading the papers cannot be condoned, it can perhaps be understood, as we hesitate to speculate how long it would take a trial court to meaningfully digest over 2,200 pages of separate statements.”)

Accepting that speedy adjudications are important, we are left with the question of how speed is best achieved. One method of achieving speedier resolutions in civil and criminal litigation is through policies promoting active “judicial case management.” Policies of this genre tend to place much of the onus for ensuring speedy resolutions on the judges themselves. In recent years, legislatures and judiciaries have enacted various regulatory measures to strengthen judicial oversight and incentivize active judicial management of civil and criminal dockets. A prominent example is the Civil Justice Reform Act (“CJRA”) of 1990. In the 1980s, litigants and legal observers complained of long delays in the federal courts, especially in civil litigation. In 1990, Congress responded by passing the CJRA, which aimed to encourage faster processing of civil litigation in federal courts. Among its many provisions, the CJRA mandated the formation of “advisory groups” tasked with identifying and reporting sources of excess cost and delay in civil litigation. However, the law is perhaps best remembered for its imposition of new judicial reporting requirements on members of the federal bench. Since 1991, the CJRA has required federal courts to prepare semiannual reports of all motions pending for more than six months and all civil cases pending for more than three years total.⁴ These reporting requirements are known colloquially as the “six-month list.”

This paper presents an empirical analysis of two related questions. First, does the six-month list’s scheme of social sanctions accomplish its ostensible goal of expediting civil adjudications? And second, does the six-month list have any effect on the *quality* of adjudications? In order to answer these questions, I combine an original large-*N* dataset of federal district court dockets with a novel identification strategy based on quasi-random variation in exposure to the six-month list. I find that the six-month list does indeed improve speed; the summary judgment motions that are most exposed to the six-month list are resolved almost a full month (15%) faster than those that are least exposed, and overall case durations are similarly impacted. I also find considerable heterogeneity across judges, with judges who are young, non-white, or female being among the most responsive to the incentives created by the six-month list. Speedier adjudications notwithstanding, I find only mixed evidence of effects on the quality of adjudications. While I do find modest effects on

⁴Under the law’s own sunset provision, the CJRA ostensibly expired in 1997. However, just months before sunset, Congress indefinitely extended the law’s hallmark reporting requirements—including the semi-annual “six-month lists.” For a discussion of the CJRA’s peculiar status post-sunset, see Carl Tobias, *The Expiration of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990*, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 541 (2002).

motion- and case-level outcomes—summary judgment motions that are most exposed to the six-month list are slightly less likely to be granted, and conditional on being appealed, judgments following motions that are more exposed to the six-month list are slightly more likely to be reversed—these results are only marginally significant and not robust to all specifications. My results suggest that—at least among federal judges—social pressure can be an effective substitute for monetary incentives. I interpret these results as consistent with an original model of judicial behavior that combines elements of career concerns, procrastination, and multitasking.

This paper contributes to several distinct literatures across multiple disciplines. First, this paper contributes to a robust literature on judicial management and judicial efficiency. Judith Resnik developed the concept of “judicial management” to describe the ways in which judges intervene in pretrial phases of litigation.⁵ Judicial management conveys two potential benefits. First, judicial management has supposedly improved the allocation of scarce judicial resources and accelerated the administration of justice, although this claim is empirically unproven and may not apply equally to appellate and districts courts.⁶ Second, it has necessitated the collection and dissemination of new data about the federal courts, with accompanying benefits for transparency and accountability.⁷ Resnik argues that these benefits may be outweighed by significant negative externalities. These include the erosion of traditional due process safeguards;⁸ a vast expansion in judicial discretion, and with it, the potential for abuse of power;⁹ and, the undermining of judicial impartiality in exchange for privacy and informality outside of courtrooms.¹⁰

Resnik’s work raises important empirical questions about the consequences of judicial management for procedural justice. What are the tradeoffs between efficiency and justice? Does speed compromise the fairness of outcomes? Several scholars have attempted to address these questions through historical case studies¹¹ and limited descriptive statistics,¹²

⁵Judith Resnik, *Managerial Judges*, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-77 (1982).

⁶*Id.* at 415, 417

⁷*Id.* at 416

⁸*Id.* at 424.

⁹*Id.* at 425.

¹⁰*Id.* at 426

¹¹Robert Post, *Judicial Management and Judicial Disinterest: The Achievements and Perils of Chief Justice William Howard Taft*, 1 J. OF SUP. CT. HISTORY (1980): 50-78.

¹²Alvin B. Rubin, *Bureaucratization of the federal courts: the tension between justice and efficiency*, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648 (1980). See also Patrick Johnston, *Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection*, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833 (1994) (analyzing the requirements of the CJRA shortly after that law went into effect); R. Lawrence Dessem, *Judicial Reporting Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!*, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 687 (1993) (similarly analyzing the requirements and early effects of the CJRA).

but with the exception of Jonah Gehlbach's study of summary judgment empirics,¹³ there has been little empirical analysis of judicial management. This paper is, to my knowledge, among the first efforts to identify the causal effects of judicial oversight schemes on the speed and quality of adjudications.

Setting aside potential unintended consequences for the quality of adjudication, speedier adjudications are generally presumed to benefit all parties. That criminal defendants benefit from swiftness of process is presumed by both the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. Whether civil litigants are entitled to the same degree of promptness is something of an open question. Stephen L. Wasby has argued that procedural delay in the courts can itself amount to a violation of due process.¹⁴ In fact, courts have frequently recognized promptness as an element of procedural due process in public benefit cases,¹⁵ but courts have been reluctant to prescribe rigid timelines.¹⁶

Whether or not litigants have a procedural right to swiftness, speed can have concrete benefits. It is well documented that the quality and bureaucratic efficiency of public institutions matters for economic growth and development, and courts are no exception. Faster courts reduce transactions costs associated with enforcing contracts and protecting personal and property rights,¹⁷ all of which are key ingredients to economic development. Moreover, the benefits of speedy adjudications also redound to the litigants themselves. Recent evidence from procedural reforms in Senegal suggest that firms value faster court procedures.¹⁸ Lengthy administrative and judicial delays can have real and lasting consequences for litigants, who may have to put aspects of their lives on hold while they await resolution of a pending dispute. In the public benefits context, for example, David Autor and coau-

¹³Jonah Gelbach, *Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life of the Parties*, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1663 (2014).

¹⁴Stephen L. Wasby, *Is Court Delay Unconstitutional?* 17 JUSTICE SYSTEM JOURNAL 267 (1994). See also Stephen L. Wasby, *Delay as a Due Process Violation* 19 JUSTICE SYSTEM JOURNAL 235 (1997).

¹⁵*Fusari v. Steinberg*, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975) (holding that "[i]n [the unemployment benefits] context, the possible length of wrongful deprivation of unemployment benefits is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the private interests," and "the rapidity of administrative review is a significant factor in assessing the sufficiency of the entire process").

¹⁶*Wright v. Califano*, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 1978) (reversing a district court's ruling that the SSA must either set a hearing schedule or make interim payments while continuing to review unsuccessful applications for old-age and survivor benefits, and observing that, while "[d]elay in administrative review ... is a significant factor in assessing the sufficiency of process ... [it is] not the only factor." Cf. *Cockrum v. Califano*, 475 F.Supp. 1222 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that delays experienced by some social security applicants were unreasonable and in violation of both the Social Security Act and the Administrative Procedure Act).

¹⁷See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, *Unbundling Institutions*, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949 (2005); Sujata Visaria, *Legal Reform and Loan Repayment: The Microeconomic Impact of Debt Recovery Tribunals in India*, 1 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 59 (2009); Matthieu Chemin, *Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court Reform in India*, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 460 (2010).

¹⁸Florence Kondylis & Mattea Stein, *The Speed of Justice* (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8372, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3147322.

thors have found that longer processing times for SSDI applications are associated with lower levels of employment and reduced earnings for multiple years *after* the initial application.¹⁹

This paper also relates to a growing empirical literature analyzing the economics of litigation. Much of this literature focuses on the ways in which court procedures affect the speed and outcomes of justice systems in a variety of jurisdictions. In the Czech Republic, for example, it has been shown that legal reforms allowing judges to follow a simplified set of judicial procedures in adjudications for minor criminal offenses caused increases to both the speed of adjudications and the likelihood that defendants were charged and convicted.²⁰ Other papers focus on the allocation of judicial resources. Yang (2016) assesses the impact of judicial vacancies on criminal justice outcomes, finding that prosecutors dismiss more cases during vacancies, and that prosecuted defendants are more likely to plead guilty and less likely to be incarcerated during vacancies.²¹ Whereas Yang focuses on variation in judicial resources, other papers have looked instead at variation in judicial caseloads. Huang (2011) and Lavie (2017) exploit an exogenous influx of immigration appeals to show that heavy caseloads caused federal appeals courts to reverse fewer lower-court decisions.²²

Closely related is a growing literature—including both theoretical and empirical contributions—analyzing the individual behaviors of judges and the group norms and practices of judging. Judge Richard Posner, for example, has developed what he calls a “labor market” model of judicial behavior.²³ However, much of the previous scholarship has focused on judges’ political ideology, and the emphasis has traditionally been on appellate courts.²⁴ My paper is more closely related to a handful of papers that consider how district court judges re-

¹⁹David H. Autor, Nicole Maestas, Kathleen J. Mullen & Alexander Strand, *Does Delay Cause Decay? The Effect of Administrative Decision Time on the Labor Force Participation and Earnings of Disability Applicants* (NBER Working Paper No. 20840, 2015), <http://www.nber.org/papers/w20840>. (Finding that a one standard deviation (2.1 month) increase in initial processing time reduces long-run employment by 3.5% and long-run annual earnings by 5.1%. They attribute these effects to “decay” employment potential while they await final adjudication of their benefits applications.

²⁰Libor Dusek and Josef Montag, *The Effects of a Simpler Criminal Procedure: Evidence from One Million Czech Cases*, (ISE Working Paper No. 1, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629116.

²¹Crystal S. Yang, *Resource Constraints and the Criminal Justice System: Evidence From Judicial Vacancies*, 8 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 289 (2016).

²²Bert I. Huang, *Lightened Scrutiny*, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011). Compare with Shay Lavie, *Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure*, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 57 (2017) (Finding that circuit courts diverged in the ways in which they responded to this sudden increase in caseload, with the Second Circuit taking longer to decide cases and issuing fewer reversals, and with Ninth Circuit judges writing fewer dissents.).

²³RICHARD A. POSNER, *HOW JUDGES THINK* 57 (2008).

²⁴See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER, *THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE* (2013); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, *Why (And When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis*, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101 (2011).

spond to reputation concerns.²⁵ I contribute what is, to my knowledge, among the first models of judicial behavior that combines elements of career concerns, multi-tasking, and procrastination.

This paper is principally concerned with how to enhance judicial efficiency, but the questions posed here have significance well beyond the rarefied world of the federal judiciary. In particular, this paper may offer answers to a question that has long vexed economists, political scientists, sociologists, and just about anyone who cares about effective government: namely, how to get the most out of bureaucrats. At least two features of public sector work are relatively distinctive. First, bureaucrats are often granted wide discretion to perform tasks that are only broadly defined. From border patrol agents to scientists at the FDA, bureaucrats enjoy a great deal of control over what they do and how they do it. Second, bureaucrats are frequently immune from many of the more traditional workplace incentives. Relative to private sector employers, public sector managers enjoy a more limited array of tools for incentivizing worker behavior. Public sector salaries and benefits are often fixed by lawmakers or regulators, and tenure rules may even inhibit the manager's ability to promote, fire, or reassign. Insofar as federal judges offer an extreme example of both these features, we might think of the judiciary as an ideal laboratory in which to learn more about how non-monetary incentives can be properly deployed in the public sector. This paper contributes quasi-experimental evidence that social sanctions can, at least under certain circumstances, be used as an effective replacement for more traditional workplace incentives.

Long ignored by empirical researchers, the CJRA—and especially the six-month list—has recently become the subject of renewed attention. In addition to my paper, the six-month list is also the focus of a recent working paper by Miguel de Figueiredo, Alexandra Lahav, and Peter Siegelman.²⁶ While their paper contributes much to our understanding of the six-month list, their key claims are inherently limited by the correlational—rather than causal—nature of much of their evidence. In particular, they compare cases adjudicated in the weeks immediately preceding the publication of the six-month list against cases adjudicated in other weeks of the year, from which they observe that plaintiff win rates decline

²⁵ See, e.g., Gilat Levy, *Careerist Judges and the Appeals Process*, 36 RAND J. Econ. 275 (2005) (analyzing a model of how trial court judges attempt to signal to the appellate courts their ability to correctly interpret the law).

²⁶ Miguel de Figueiredo, Alexandra D. Lahav, & Peter Siegelman, *Against Judicial Accountability: Evidence from the Six-Month List*, (February 20, 2018) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2989777).

in the weeks immediately preceding the six-month list.²⁷ Importantly, they cannot rule out the possibility that cases decided in the weeks preceding the list are systematically (and *ex ante*) different from cases decided at other times of the year. Furthermore, many of their results are based on a public-use dataset of federal civil case terminations. Since the most important features of the six-month list relate to the adjudication of *motions*, and not cases, they are limited in their ability to make causal claims regarding the effects of the six-month list on motion adjudication. Where they do make causal claims, their results are based on a hand-coded dataset of just 781 summary judgment motions filed over a 60-day period in September and August, 2011.²⁸ Given this small sample size, the authors' causal identification strategy has vulnerabilities. For example, they cannot take into account the potentially confounding effects of seasonality, nor are they able to rule out that there is something aberrant about this particular sample of hand-coded motions. Perhaps most importantly, their relatively small sample size makes it difficult to rule out strategic filing by litigants and their attorneys, which is a crucial assumption for their identification strategy.

I contribute the first empirical analysis of the causal effects of the six-month list based on a large-N motion-level dataset of almost 500,000 motions drawn from almost 300,000 separate cases. Some of my results are, in fact, quite similar to those found by de Figueiredo *et al.* For example, we both find that the six-month list tends to expedite motion and case disposition.²⁹ However, some of their conclusions are at odds with my own results. For example, they find no evidence of an effect on motion grant rates, denials, or partial denials.³⁰ In contrast, based on my much larger dataset, I find that exposure to the six-month list slightly decreases the probability of an order granting summary judgment. At the case level, they find correlational evidence that cases decided immediately before the six-month list are more likely to later be remanded back to the district court by the Court of Appeals.³¹ When I test this result in a causal framework, I find no evidence of an effect on the remand rate, but I do find evidence of a modest effect on the rates at which lower-court judgments are either reversed or affirmed. Finally, an important difference between the two papers is that mine is the first to contribute evidence on heterogeneity between judges—along dimensions including age, race, and gender—in their responsiveness to the six-month list.

²⁷*Id.* at 46.

²⁸*Id.* at 15.

²⁹*Id.* at 30.

³⁰*Id.* at 53.

³¹*Id.* at 50.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background on the six-month list, including the history of the initiative and details on its design. Section 3 discusses a brief conceptual framework for considering the likely effects of the six-month list, with an emphasis placed on how the six-month list has shaped judicial incentives. Section 4 describes the original motion-level data that will form the basis of my empirical analysis. Section 5 outlines the empirical framework for my analysis, with an emphasis on how I will tease causal effects out of a real-world policy change. Section 6 presents preliminary results on the two primary research questions. First, does the six-month list accomplish its ostensible goal of promoting speedy adjudications, and second, what—if any—are its consequences for the quality of adjudication? Section 6 also offers evidence on how the effects of the six-month list vary across judges. Section 7 offers insights—drawn from my empirical analysis—for the future of civil justice reform. Section 8 concludes with a discussion of directions for future research.

2 Legal & Policy Background: Where the “Six-Month List” Came From and What It Does

The “six-month list” refers to what is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 476 (2012), which states that “[t]he Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall prepare a semiannual report, available to the public, that discloses for each judicial officer the number of motions that have been pending for more than six months and the name of each case in which such motion has been pending.”³² The law was just one component of the so-called Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (“CJRA”). Congress was explicit about its intentions. “The purpose of [the CJRA] . . . [was] to facilitate reduction in the delays and expense of civil litigation.”³³

The drafting and passage of the CJRA was swift—from introduction to enactment, it occupied the Congress for less than twelve months.³⁴ However, appetite for civil justice reform had long been growing. In a speech to the American Law Institute on May 17, 1983, Chief Justice Warren Burger decried what he saw as a nation plagued “with an almost

³²Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 103, 28 U.S.C. § 476 (2012).

³³H.R. REP. NO. 101-732, at 7 (1990).

³⁴See Jeffrey J. Peck, *Users United: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990*, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 105, 107 (1991).

irrational focus—virtually a mania—on litigation as a way to solve all problems.”³⁵ Similar sentiments were voiced in the popular media.³⁶

Among those listening to the calls for reform was Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware. Beginning in 1988, Senator Biden (then chairperson of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary) commissioned a report from the Brookings Institution and the Foundation for Change.³⁷ The request to the Brookings Institution was itself prompted by the results of a survey of judges and attorneys conducted by private polling firm Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. The Harris survey, which sought to identify sources of excess cost and delay in civil litigation, laid particular blame at the feet of “over-discovery” in civil cases.³⁸ The Brookings Task Force was convened not only to transform the Harris survey results into actionable recommendations for reform, but also to build consensus around those recommendations.³⁹ Members of the Task Force included “leading litigators from the plaintiff and defense bars, civil and women’s rights lawyers, attorneys representing consumer and environmental organizations, former trial and appellate court judges, representatives of the insurance industry, general counsel of major corporations, and law professors.”⁴⁰ Among the recommendations of the Brookings Task Force was a prototype of what would become the six-month list: “Accordingly, we recommend that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts be directed to computerize, in each district, the court’s docket so that quarterly reports can be made to the public of at least all pending submitted motions before each judge that are unresolved for more than 30, 60, and 90 days . . . We believe that substantially expanding the availability of public information about caseloads by judge will encourage judges with significant backlogs in undecided motions and cases to resolve those matters and to move their cases along more quickly.”⁴¹

The Brookings Task Force Report informed much of the conversation on Capitol Hill. In fact, an early House Resolution called for implementing a near facsimile of the Task Force recommendations.⁴² The proposal was based on the findings that “delays in deciding fully

³⁵Stuart Taylor, Jr., *Justice System Stifled by Its Costs and Its Complexity, Experts Warn*, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1983, at 1, A1.

³⁶*See, e.g.*, WALTER K. OLSON, *THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT* (1992).

³⁷Peck, *supra* note 34 at 107.

³⁸*Id.*

³⁹*Id.*

⁴⁰*Id.*

⁴¹BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, *JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION* 27 (1989).

⁴²H.R. 3898, 101st Cong. (1990).

briefed motions contribute to the costs of litigation by preventing the narrowing of issues, encouraging the parties to conduct unnecessary discovery and requiring rediscovery,” and “the reduction of such delays can be encouraged by substantially expanding the availability of public information about backlogs in undecided motions.”⁴³ While the language of the CJRA and its legislative history invoke principles of procedural fairness, Congress appears to have been largely driven by economic motives. Members of Congress observed that “the cost and delays in civil litigation . . . are harmful to both the national economy and to the fairness of our legal system.”⁴⁴ Finally, after several committee hearings, the CJRA passed both houses of Congress on October 27, 1990.⁴⁵

Under the CJRA, federal courts must prepare semiannual reports of all motions⁴⁶ pending in civil cases for more than six months⁴⁷ and all civil cases pending for more than three years. Also listed in the semiannual reports are bench trials that have been submitted for six months or more,⁴⁸ and, since 1998, bankruptcy and social security appeals pending six months or more.⁴⁹ CJRA semiannual reports are posted to a United States Courts website, where members of the public can access approximately eight years of prior reports.⁵⁰ Appendix figure 11 displays an excerpt from the September 30, 2016, CJRA six-month report.

One might be skeptical that the six-month list would actually have any effect on judicial behavior. The six-month list provides little more than a behavioral nudge,⁵¹ and federal

⁴³*Id.*

⁴⁴*Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 5381 and H.R. 3898, 101st Cong. 83 (1990) (statement of Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr.).*

⁴⁵Peck, *supra* note 34 at 109.

⁴⁶An exception is motions filed in habeas corpus petitions, which are generally exempt from the CJRA’s reporting requirements. See Marc D. Falkoff, *The Hidden Costs of Habeas Delay*, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 339, 346 (arguing, in fact, that their exemption from the six-month encourages judges to deprioritize habeas petitions, exacerbating problems of delay).

⁴⁷Implementation guidelines give motions a thirty-day grace period before they are considered “pending” for the purposes of the six-month list. As a result, motions actually have at least seven months before they could potentially appear on a six-month list. Implementation guidelines are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/cjra_na_0930.2017.pdf.

⁴⁸Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 103, 28 U.S.C. § 476 (2012).

⁴⁹JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 63 (Sept. 15, 1998).


⁵⁰Available at <http://www.uscourts.gov/data-table-report-names/civil-justice-reform-act-cjra>.

⁵¹See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008) (“A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid.”) Later in the article I will argue that the six-month list does indeed alter judges’ economic incentives, although not significantly and not with any near-term consequences. Moreover, it is both cheap and easy for a judge to avoid an appearance on the list. In any case, whether or not the six-month list fits precisely within the formal definition of a “behavioral nudge” is unimportant for the purposes of this article.

judges are hard to incentivize. Article III judges enjoy lifetime tenure and protected salaries, and more generally, they are likely accustomed to being treated with independence and deference.

And yet, the data reveal that the six-month list *does* matter for judicial behavior. Figure 1 presents counts of summary judgment motion dispositions by calendar day for the period 2004-2014. Dotted lines mark the two six-month list deadlines of March 31st and September 30th. The effects of the six-month list are immediately discernible: the pace of motion dispositions begins to increase in the months of the reporting deadlines, with a large mass of motion dispositions in the days immediately preceding the deadlines.

Figure 1: **Histogram of Summary Judgment Motion Dispositions (by calendar day)**
All Federal Civil Cases, 2004-2014



Descriptive evidence suggest not only that the six-month list affects *when* judges do their work, but also *how* they do it. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics from two samples of summary judgment motions: those ruled on “in the shadow” of the six-month list—that is, in the two weeks immediately preceding a CJRA six-month list—and those ruled on at any other time of the year.

The patterns are striking. Motions decided in the two weeks immediately preceding either of the six-month lists are substantially older (by an average of more than 2.6 months). They are more likely to have been filed in a lawsuit involving at least one *pro se* litigant, and

Table 1: Comparison of Means: Summary Judgments Decided Immediately
Before 6-Month List Vs. All Others
All Civil Cases, (2004-2014)

	(1) Last Two Weeks	(2) All Other Weeks	(3) Difference in Means
Months Until Disposition	7.614 (5.164)	4.944 (4.329)	2.671 [0.096]***
Reporting Time (months)	9.739 (1.749)	10.063 (1.743)	-0.323 [0.042]***
% Granted	0.461 (0.498)	0.483 (0.500)	-0.022 [0.006]***
% Granted in part	0.166 (0.372)	0.141 (0.348)	0.025 [0.005]***
% Denied	0.361 (0.480)	0.363 (0.481)	-0.002 [0.006]
% Decided for Plaintiff	0.258 (0.438)	0.278 (0.448)	-0.020 [0.004]***
% Decided for Defendant	0.566 (0.496)	0.568 (0.495)	-0.002 [0.005]
% Order Appealed	0.287 (0.452)	0.218 (0.413)	0.069 [0.011]***
% Filed Pro Se	0.206 (0.404)	0.180 (0.384)	0.025 [0.012]**
% In Forma Pauperis	0.196 (0.397)	0.154 (0.361)	0.042 [0.013]***
<i>N</i>	32,058	449,204	481,262

This table presents a comparison of means between summary judgment motions decided in the two weeks immediately preceding the publication of a six-month list (that is, in the final two weeks of March and the final two weeks of September) and summary judgment motions decided in all other weeks of the calendar year. Details on the sample are provided in Section 4. Columns (1) and (2) show sample means with standard deviations in parentheses, and column (3) shows differences in means with standard errors in brackets.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

they are more likely to have been filed in a lawsuit where one of the litigants has sought a waiver of court fees (i.e. *in forma pauperis*). Perhaps most striking, the rulings themselves are different. Motions decided in the two weeks prior to the six-month list are less likely to be granted in full (by approximately 2.2 percentage points), they are more likely to be granted in part (by approximately 2.5 percentage points), and they are nearly 6.9 percentage points more likely to be followed by a subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeals. In fact, Table 2 corroborates some of the main findings from the de Figueiredo *et al.* working paper, including their observation that the plaintiff win rate decreases in weeks immediately preceding the six-month list. The patterns shown here, however, are decidedly non-causal. Since there may well be systematic differences between the types of motions decided in the weeks preceding the publication of the six-month list and those decided at other times, the latter group does not constitute an adequate “control” group. Nonetheless, these patterns do suggest that the six-month list has *some* effect on judicial behavior. In the remainder of this article the goal will be to investigate with greater scientific rigor just what the nature of that effect is. First, the following section provides a brief conceptual framework for considering how the six-month list shapes judicial incentives and what the consequences are likely to be for judicial behavior.

3 Conceptual Framework: A Model of Judicial Behavior Against the Backdrop of the Six-Month List

According to Judge Richard Posner, “[t]he economic theory of judicial behavior has to surmount two difficulties. One is neglect of psychological factors—of cognitive limitations and emotional forces that shape behavior along with rational calculation . . . [and t]he other . . . is that of identifying the incentives and constraints that shape the vocational behavior of workers whose work is so structured as to eliminate the common incentives and constraints of the workplace. Federal judges cannot be removed from office, short of gross misconduct, and cannot be docked pay, exiled to undesirable judicial venues, or paid bonuses.”⁵² In the following section, I develop a model of judicial behavior that, I hope, addresses both challenges identified by Judge Posner. My conceptual framework combines elements from three categories of models—namely, career concerns-style models, models featuring procrastina-

⁵²RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 37 (2008).

tion or “present bias,” and multitasking models—all of which are common in economics and other social sciences. I will rely on this conceptual framework as I consider which types of incentives are likely to be most effective at influencing judicial behavior, and as I consider the potential trade-offs between various goals of the civil justice system.

The standard career concerns model was in part an attempt to explain the absence of performance-based incentive contracts in many real-world settings.⁵³ The basic idea is that, even in the absence of performance pay, agents will exert positive effort so long as their “career concerns” (often modeled as future compensation, perhaps due to raises, promotions, or outside offers by competitor firms) so dictate. The model has its roots in Eugene Fama’s observation that corporate managers will be influenced by reputational concerns.⁵⁴ The theory was later formalized in models by Bengt Holmstrom and Milton Harris.⁵⁵ Career concern-like forces have been validated in various empirical settings, including among mutual fund managers, for whom the possibility of termination creates career concerns, especially early in their careers.⁵⁶

Even for federal judges, whose tenure and salaries are protected, the career concerns model may have some explanatory power. Particularly relevant to judges is the possibility of promotion. US District Court judges may be motivated by the prospect of elevation to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and appellate judges may be motivated by the prospects—however remote—of elevation to the Supreme Court. Moreover, while many judges retire from the bench, many others will continue on to a second career in private practice, legal academia, or elsewhere. Judges may therefore be motivated to maintain a good reputation in the eyes of future employers. The career concerns model suggests that judges are likely to comply with the six-month list, lest their non-compliance adversely affect their future career prospects. The career concerns model also predicts a degree of heterogeneity among judges. In particular, the six-month list is likely to generate the largest response from young judges, for whom a promotion is both more likely (since Presidents like to appoint judges who are young enough to sit on the bench for several years to come) and more valuable (since they have more years left during which to enjoy the fruits of a promotion). Since

⁵³Since performance-based pay alleviates many of the moral hazard problems seen in traditional employment/agency contracts, economists have long thought it puzzling that performance-based pay is not more common than it is.

⁵⁴Eugene F. Fama, *Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm*, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).

⁵⁵See Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, *A Theory of Wage Dynamics*, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 315 (1982); Bengt Holmstrom, *Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective*, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 169 (1999).

⁵⁶Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison, *Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers*, 114 Q. J. ECON. 389 (1999).

young judges have less professional history, each instance of compliance or non-compliance with the six-month list may also contribute more to their colleagues' posterior beliefs about their competency. I test for and confirm the presence of judge heterogeneity in section 6.3 of the paper.

While reputational concerns are natural, so too is the tendency for procrastination. Procrastination is a common feature of behavioral economics models. The canonical model is attributable to George Akerlof, who observed that “present benefits and costs may have undue salience relative to future costs and benefits.”⁵⁷ Procrastination in the economics literature is typically modeled with time-inconsistent preferences, often with hyperbolic discount functions.⁵⁸

The empirical evidence for procrastination spans a wide variety of real-world settings.⁵⁹ Perhaps most relevant to federal judges is a recent working paper by Michael Frakes and Melissa Wasserman, who show that procrastination is commonplace among at least one group of judge-like bureaucrats: namely, examiners for the U.S. Patent Office.⁶⁰ They find that patent examiners routinely procrastinate until just before deadlines. They find additional evidence that stricter deadlines are associated with reductions in examiner scrutiny, resulting in higher grant rates for low-quality patent applications. Also relevant is a paper by Raj Chetty, Emmanuel Saez, and Laszlo Sandor, who document procrastination among journal referees.⁶¹ In fact, the experimental intervention studied by Chetty *et al.* is remarkably similar to the six-month list itself. In their study, journal referees are told that their turnaround times will be posted on a publicly-available website. They find that these social sanctions are nearly as effective as cash incentives at reducing delays in peer review.⁶²

Insofar as judges respond to the six-month list, a procrastination-style model may explain why. Due to the career concerns described above, the six-month list increases the cost of delay, which is likely to result in faster adjudications on average. Moreover, since present effort is still more costly than future effort, procrastination-style models predict that judges will wait until immediately before the six-month list publication dates to dispose of their

⁵⁷George A. Akerlof, *Procrastination and Obedience*, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1991).

⁵⁸See, e.g., David Laibson, *Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting*, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443 (1997).

⁵⁹See, e.g., Supreet Kaur, Michael Kremer, & Sendhil Mullainathan, *Self-Control at Work*, 123 J. POL. ECON. 1227 (2015) (Documenting procrastination among data-entry workers).

⁶⁰Michael D. Frakes and Melissa F. Wasserman, *Procrastination in the Workplace: Evidence from the U.S. Patent Office* (NBER Working Paper No. 22987, 2016), <http://www.nber.org/papers/w22987>.

⁶¹Raj Chetty, Emmanuel Saez, & Laszlo Sandor, *What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior? An Experiment with Referees at the Journal of Public Economics*, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 169 (2014).

⁶²*Id.* at 181.

overdue motions. This has the potential to generate the patterns observed in Figure 1.

Finally, my conceptual framework incorporates additional insights from Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom's 1991 multitask principal-agent (or "multitask") model.⁶³ The multitask model has quickly become a canonical model in law and economics (and particularly in the field of contract theory); multitask models are especially useful for considering trade-offs between competing goals or priorities.

Relative to the traditional principal-agent problem—wherein an agent performs a single task or makes a single decision on behalf of a principal, often contrary to the principal's best interests—the multitask model is most appropriate for settings in which an agent is simultaneously responsible for multiple tasks or decisions, or in which the agent's single task consists of multiple dimensions. The basic intuition of the multitask model is easily understood in the context of classroom teaching. Consider a school teacher who is responsible for several aspects of his students' enrichment. He is tasked with teaching his students reading, writing, and arithmetic, but he is also responsible for cultivating certain "soft skills," like their ability to work in groups and empathize with others. However, the students are subject to annual standardized testing, and the standardized tests measure only reading and math skills. If the teacher's performance evaluations are tied to his students' test scores, then common sense dictates that the teacher will spend a disproportionate share of his time teaching his students reading and math, and he will give less attention to the so-called soft skills.

The "teaching to the test" problem faced by teachers mimics some of the same incentives imposed on federal district judges. Judges are expected to meet simultaneous goals of speed, accuracy, and fairness. Among these goals, speed is almost certainly the easiest to monitor. In any given case, speed-related metrics can be easily calculated from basic docket information. Judges can be compared in terms of average age of caseload, average time until disposition, average decisional time for various types of motions, and so on. Accuracy and fairness, on the other hand, are much more difficult to monitor, and observable statistics are likely to belie the truth. Two judges may have very different plaintiff win rates, but how can we determine whether either is more fair or accurate? Do the fair and accurate judges grant more summary judgments or fewer? We can look to appellate outcomes—i.e.,

⁶³Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom, *Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design*, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991).

how often is the judge reversed on appeal, and how often is she affirmed—but most matters are never appealed, and even when they are, appellate judges are no less human than their lower-court colleagues. Under these conditions, where some tasks are more easily monitored than others, high-powered incentives are likely to distort judges’ behavior towards the more easily monitored task. The reasoning is straightforward. If time is scarce, and efforts at judicial economy are rewarded more directly than efforts at accuracy or fairness, then the rational judge should take actions that tend to favor speed over either accuracy or fairness.

With respect to the six-month list, the multitask model predicts that, insofar as the list promotes speed, it may also have adverse effects on adjudicative quality. Any evidence of effects on substantive motion outcomes (e.g. grant & denial rates, plaintiff or defendant win-rates, etc.) or appellate outcomes (e.g. appeals rates, reversal rates, etc.) will tend to confirm this hypothesis.⁶⁴

Putting together these various pieces, my conceptual framework yields several predictions. First, my model predicts that exposure to the six-month list will yield faster adjudications on average, with judges deciding many of their motions in the days and weeks immediately preceding the six-month list deadlines. Second, the multitask model suggests that exposure to the six-month list *may* result in changes to substantive case outcomes, but this relationship is likely to depend on factors including the degree of judges’ present bias, the strength of the reward for judicial effort, and the substitutability between speed and effort. Third, I anticipate that judges will respond to the six-month list heterogeneously, with judges for whom career concerns are especially salient being among the most sensitive to the six-month list. The remainder of this paper proceeds to test these hypotheses. But first, the following section introduces the data behind my empirical analysis.

4 Data and Descriptive Statistics

This paper makes use of novel motion-level data from civil cases filed in the United States District Courts. I constructed my original dataset from Westlaw’s database of U.S. District Court civil docket reports.⁶⁵ Commonly known as the “DCT” database, these data contain

⁶⁴This section is dedicated to a summary description of my conceptual framework. A preliminary version of my formal model is presented in section 9.1 of the Appendix.

⁶⁵A docket is an administrative record of the proceedings of a particular court case. Each event that transpires in the case—for example, when a litigant files a motion or a brief, when the judge holds a hearing, or when the

much of the same docket information contained in the government's own PACER database. The same DCT database formed the basis of Jonah Gelbach's 2014 study of summary judgment motion filings and judicial characteristics.⁶⁶ The data were obtained as raw XML files⁶⁷ consisting of both case-level background information (including case filing date; case termination date, if applicable; judge name; detailed names of parties and their lawyers; and standardized codes for the nature of the suit) as well as the text of docket entries pertaining to activity in the case. I wrote computer code to scrape and parse the docket entries and to re-organize them as a motion-level dataset of all summary judgment motions filed between 2004 and 2014. More specifically, my code searched each docket for docket entries corresponding to original motions for summary judgment. It then matched these motions to docket entries corresponding to court orders disposing of the motion. The motion-level data include the date on which a motion was filed; the identity of the moving party (i.e. whether the motion was filed by the plaintiff or defendant); the date, if any, on which the motion was decided by the court; and the outcome, if any, of the motion (i.e. whether it was granted, denied, granted-in-part, or dismissed due to mootness).

In addition to the original motion-level data, this paper leverages three public-use datasets. First, individual motions are merged with public-use case-level data from the Administrative Office (AO) of the U.S. Federal Courts.⁶⁸ In particular, I make use of the Integrated Database (IDB) of civil cases filed, terminated, and pending in federal district courts since the 1970 statistical year.⁶⁹ The IDB is prepared by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), which is a government research and education agency housed within the federal judiciary. I matched motions to cases on the basis of docket number, filing date, and the court in which the case was filed. Although these public-use data provide very little information that was not already available in the Westlaw DCT database, what these data do provide is the opportunity to validate certain aspects of my motion-level data against a commonly-used public-use dataset.

Second, I have similarly merged my motion-level data with a dataset of appeals filed before the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The appellate dataset is also obtained from the FJC's IDB.

judge issues a ruling—is recorded as a docket entry.

⁶⁶Gelbach, *supra* note 13 at 1676.

⁶⁷XML files look much like basic text files, but with additional metadata to indicate the structure of underlying information.

⁶⁸Available at: <https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb>.

⁶⁹The federal courts utilize a statistical year beginning on October 1st.

By merging district court cases with subsequent appeals, I can begin to explore whether exposure to the six-month list had any effect on either appeal rates or appellate outcomes (e.g. whether the appellate court affirms, reverses, remands, etc.).

Last, I have merged my data with a database of judge characteristics, also available from the FJC.⁷⁰ The FJC's database of judges contains a wealth of demographic and biographical details relating to U.S. federal judges. I will use the data on judge characteristics in order to probe potential heterogeneity in how judges respond to the six-month list.

The result is a dataset consisting of 481,262 summary judgment motions arising from a total of 297,153 separate cases, reflecting an average of approximately 1.62 summary judgment motions per case.⁷¹ Of these, I was able to identify an explicit disposition (including both the date and outcome of the disposition) for 206,513 separate motions (43% of the total). The relatively low rate at which I was able to match new motions to motion dispositions reflects three realities. First, although I restrict to motions filed at least one year prior to the end of my sample period, there are some motions and cases that had not been adjudicated by the end of my sample period.⁷² Second, when a case is disposed of on other grounds—for example, when the parties negotiate a settlement—the docket will not always clearly reflect a specific disposition for each pending motion. Insofar as a disposition on other grounds is increasingly likely the longer a motion has been pending, this is likely to limit variation in the amount of time that motions spend pending, and it is therefore likely to bias my results towards zero. Third, given the difficulty of parsing highly variable text entries, it is quite possible that my algorithm has simply failed to identify some dispositions. Insofar as these limitations introduce simple measurement error, they are likely to further attenuate my findings (i.e. bias them towards zero).

Table 4 summarizes my original motion-level dataset. Among the sample of summary judgment motions in which a disposition could be identified, approximately 64% were filed by the defendant, and approximately 29% were filed by the plaintiff, reflecting the pro-defendant bias of the summary judgment device. I was unable to identify a movant in the remaining 7% of cases, which may indicate that summary judgment was entered by the

⁷⁰Available at: <https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/biographical-directory-article-iii-federal-judges>

⁷¹Although summary judgment motions are most often filed by the defendant, plaintiffs will often file summary judgment motions of their own. Moreover, in cases with multiple defendants, separate defendants will often file separate motions for summary judgment.

⁷²In alternate specifications, I will also restrict to motions that were decided within one year, in order to ensure that all motions within my sample were given an equal opportunity to be decided.

court *sua sponte*. The average summary judgment motion was decided in approximately 5.36 months (compared to an average overall case duration of slightly less than two years.⁷³ The remaining rows show that motions for summary judgment are frequently granted, with approximately 62% of my sample being either fully granted or granted in part.

Table 2: Summary Statistics, Summary Judgment Motions
All Civil Cases, (2004-2014)

	(1) Full Sample	(2) Ruled-On
% Filed by Plaintiff	0.28 (0.449)	0.29 (0.455)
% Filed by Defendant	0.61 (0.488)	0.64 (0.481)
Months Until 6-Month Report	10.04 (1.745)	10.03 (1.748)
Months Until Disposition		5.36 (4.572)
% Motion granted		0.48 (0.500)
% Motion granted in part		0.14 (0.352)
% Motion denied		0.36 (0.481)
% Motion Decided for Plaintiff		0.28 (0.447)
% Motion Decided for Defendant		0.57 (0.495)
% Appealed		0.26 (0.440)
Observations	481,262	206,513


This table presents summary statistics on the main motion-level dataset. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses below sample mean.

The summary statistics presented above show mean motion duration, but we may learn more by examining the full distribution of motion durations. Figure 2 shows a histogram of total summary judgment motion duration (i.e. months pending before disposition) for my main sample of adjudicated motions. Although the modal duration is less than five months,

⁷³Since summary judgment motions occur relatively late in the course of litigation, the average overall case duration in my dataset is likely to be higher than the average overall case duration across all civil filings in U.S. district courts.

a large share ($\sim 32\%$) of motions are pending for between six and thirteen months. Fewer than 4% of motions extend beyond thirteen months.

Figure 2: **Histogram of Summary Judgment Motion Durations (months until disposition)**



Each motion in my dataset is assigned a “Nature of Suit” code indicating the nature of the underlying suit. Being that my data are drawn from the entirety of district court civil filings, my main sample spans a wide variety of case types. Appendix Figure 12 shows the approximate distribution. It is worth noting that the legal significance of a summary judgment motion, as well as the value to litigants of judicial efficiency, is likely to vary across these case types.⁷⁴ Among the most common case types are employment discrimination, personal injury, prisoners’ rights,⁷⁵ and other civil rights suits.

5 Empirical Framework

The following section provides details on my empirical framework, the goal of which is to estimate the causal effects of exposure to the six-month list on both the speed and quality

⁷⁴As detailed in the Section 5, most specifications will include nature-of-suit fixed effects in order to control for systematic differences between case types.

⁷⁵Note that the prisoners’ rights cases in my dataset do not include petitions for habeas corpus, which are excluded from the CJRA’s reporting requirements. Prior to excluding them from my sample, summary judgment motions filed in habeas petitions accounted for approximately 2% of my raw sample of summary judgment motions.

of district court adjudications. Under the CJRA, federal courts must prepare semiannual reports of all motions pending more than six months and all civil cases pending more than three years. Because the reports are published just twice a year—on March 31st and September 30th—cases and motions vary in their “reporting time,” which is the term I will use to refer to the amount of time that a judge could *hypothetically* spend reviewing a motion before that motion must appear for the first time on a six-month list. In other words, cases and motions can be more or less exposed to the list. Under implementation guidelines established by the federal judiciary, “[a] motion becomes pending 30 days after the date it was filed or was referred to a magistrate judge, whichever is later.”⁷⁶ Accounting for this 30-day grace period, motions will vary between approximately seven and thirteen months of reporting time.

Figure 3 illustrates two extreme examples of motions’ relative exposure to the six-month list. Consider first a motion filed on February 29, 2016,⁷⁷ depicted by the top panel of Figure 3. According to the implementation guidelines, the motion becomes pending 30 days later, which happens to fall on March 30th. On March 31st, when the next six-month list is published, the motion has only been pending for one day, so the motion is of course ineligible to appear on the list. However, fast-forwarding to September 30, 2016, the motion has been pending for exactly six months, and if the judge has not yet disposed of it, it must appear on the September 30th list. Counting the days between February 29th (when the motion was filed) and September 30th (when the motion becomes eligible for its first six-month list), the motion enjoys 214 days (or approximately seven months) of reporting time. Now, consider a motion filed just one day later, on March 1st, 2016, depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 3. The motion becomes pending 30 days later, on March 31st. On September 30, 2016, the motion has been pending for just short of six months, so the motion is ineligible to appear on the September 30th list. Instead, the motion does not become eligible until March 31, 2017, at which point the motion has already enjoyed 395 days (or approximately thirteen months) of reporting time. Between these two extremes, motions will vary between seven and thirteen months of reporting time. Figure 4 plots reporting time as a function of motion filing date.

⁷⁶Available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/cjra_na_0930.2017.pdf.

⁷⁷Note that 2016 was a leap year, although a motion filed on February 28th of any other year would have exactly the same reporting time.

Figure 3: Examples of Six-Month List “Reporting Time”





Figure 4: 6-month list “Reporting Time” as a function of filing date



Stated in the simplest terms, my empirical strategy consists of comparing the outcomes of motions with relatively high reporting time to the outcomes of otherwise similar motions with relatively low reporting time. In the following section I consider the assumptions that must be met in order for my approach to yield credibly identified causal estimates of the effects of the six-month list.

5.1 Identifying Assumptions

Identification requires that, conditional on the available motion- and case-level controls, the date on which a motion is filed is effectively random. In other words, it would be a problem for my identification if parties timed their motion filings strategically in order to take advantage of the six-month list. If litigants file their motions strategically—for example,

seeking to either expedite or delay the adjudication of their motions by filing just before or after a reporting deadline, or seeking to take advantage of a judge's tendency to either grant or deny motions depending upon their relative exposure to the six-month list—then it could be the case that motions filed with high reporting time are systematically different from those filed with low reporting time. It would be similarly problematic if judges manipulated motion filing dates—for example, by issuing a scheduling order—in order to take advantage of the six-month list.

My key identifying assumption can therefore be stated as follows: while judges may allow the six-month list to influence how they adjudicate a motion, they do not preemptively manipulate the timing of motion filings; and, moreover, litigants and lawyers are either unaware of the six-month list or they do not care enough about it to take it into account when they choose a motion filing date. To be sure, this assumption violates some common sense. As we are reminded by Jonah Gelbach, litigants are not “inanimate particles bouncing around and filing motions exogenously,” but rather “live parties—who, together with their attorneys, make deliberate, strategic decisions.”⁷⁸ However, there are several good reasons to believe that litigants do not file motions strategically with respect to the six-month list. First, and perhaps most importantly, litigation is complicated even in the absence of judicial reporting rules, and to predict the impact of motion filing date on a judge's behavior would only complicate things further. In other words, lawyers and litigants are “boundedly rational.”⁷⁹ Moreover, motion filing dates are often dictated by pre-established filing deadlines, and many motions are dependent upon the occurrence of other events. For example, motions for summary judgment must be filed within 30 days of the completion of discovery,⁸⁰ and the completion of discovery is itself likely to be dictated by local court rules and case-specific scheduling orders. It seems unlikely that either judges or litigants are thinking about the intricacies of the six-month list when, several months in advance of a summary judgment motion, they are formulating their discovery plans under Rule 26(f). These factors will only be amplified by the many simultaneous cases between which attorneys and judges must typically divide their attention.

Of course, when possible, the best place to look for support of an identifying assumption is in the data itself. If, contrary to our identifying assumption, motion filings are timed


⁷⁸Gelbach, *supra* note 13 at 1668.

⁷⁹Herbert A. Simon, *A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice*, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955).

⁸⁰FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b)

strategically in response to the six-month list, then we might expect to see such a pattern in the data. In fact, no such pattern is discernible. Figure 5 shows a histogram of the empirical distribution of motion filings by calendar day. Calendar dates with unusually high filing counts (more than two standard deviations above the daily mean) are labeled from above. While a pattern does emerge, there is no obvious relationship to the six-month list reporting deadlines. Instead, what we see are merely bi-weekly spikes at approximately the beginning, middle, and end of each month—*regardless* of month—and large dips on or around major federal holidays like January 1st, July 4th, and December 25th. The bi-weekly spikes may reflect law firm customs, where billable hours are often due on a bi-weekly or monthly basis, or it may simply reflect judges’ and lawyers’ natural tendency to schedule business for certain “anchoring” dates. Regardless, after taking into account these bi-weekly spikes, motion filings appear to be relatively uniform throughout the course of the calendar year.

Figure 5: **Histogram of Summary Judgment Motion Filings (by calendar day)**
All Federal Civil Cases, 2004-2014




This point is further illustrated by Figure 6a, which shows a kernel density plot of the raw empirical distribution. In comparison, Figure 6b plots the same empirical distribution after controlling for dummy variables indicating the first, fifteenth, and last day of each month.⁸¹ Neither graph shows any discernible relationship between motion filings and

⁸¹Specifically, Figure 6b plots the residuals from a linear regression of total motion filings (per calendar day) on dummies for the first, fifteenth, and last day of each month.

six-month-list cutoff dates.

Figure 6: **Summary Judgment Motion Filings (by calendar day)**
All Federal Civil Cases, 2004-2014



Stepping back from the formal identifying assumptions, it is worth stating the goal of these assumptions, which is to establish a “control” group of motions that were relatively unexposed to the six-month list against which we can compare the motions that were most exposed. We want to establish that, aside from their exposure to the six-month list, motions in the treatment and control groups are otherwise similar. Reassuringly, Table 5.1 shows that a variety of *ex ante* motion- and case-level controls are “balanced” across motions with high and low reporting time. Relative to motions with high reporting time, motions with low reporting time are no more likely to be filed by either the plaintiff or the defendant, they are no more or less likely to be filed in a case with at least one *pro se* litigant, they are no more or less likely to be likely to be filed in a case where at least one litigant has sought *in forma pauperis* status, and they share a similar distribution with respect to the nature of the suit. While balance across observable characteristics does not guarantee balance across unobservable characteristics, it does suggest that motions with high reporting time represent a reasonable control group against which to compare motions with relatively low reporting time.

As shown above, the data offer little support for the notion that either judges or litigants are strategically manipulating motion filing dates in order to take advantage of the six-month-list. Nevertheless, an Instrumental Variables strategies may obviate the need for this identifying assumption altogether. Specifically, in future work I intend to use certain milestones in the course of litigation (for example, the date on which the case was filed, or the date on which discovery was initiated or completed) in order to instrument for the date

Table 3: Comparison of Means: Low versus High Reporting Time
Summary Judgment Motions, All Civil Cases, (2004-2014)

	(1) Low Reporting Time	(2) High Reporting Time	(3) Difference in Means
Reporting Time (months)	8.500 (0.880)	11.523 (0.864)	3.023 [0.016]***
% Filed by Pltf.	0.280 (0.449)	0.281 (0.450)	0.001 [0.003]
% Filed by Deft.	0.606 (0.489)	0.608 (0.488)	0.002 [0.004]
% Pro Se	0.182 (0.386)	0.182 (0.386)	-0.001 [0.002]
% I.F.P.	0.157 (0.364)	0.157 (0.363)	-0.000 [0.002]
% Prisoner Rights	0.135 (0.341)	0.132 (0.339)	-0.002 [0.002]
% Employment Discrim.	0.103 (0.304)	0.103 (0.304)	0.000 [0.002]
% Personal Injury	0.120 (0.325)	0.123 (0.328)	0.003 [0.007]
% Soc. Sec.	0.103 (0.304)	0.102 (0.303)	-0.001 [0.002]
<i>N</i>	235,905	245,357	481,262

This table presents a comparison of means between summary judgment motions with low (i.e. less than 10 months) and high (i.e. at least 10 months) reporting time. Columns (1) and (2) show sample means with standard deviations in parentheses, and column (3) shows differences in means with standard errors in brackets.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

on which a summary judgment motion was actually filed.

The following section translates my basic empirical framework into a series of estimating equations. In particular, I will estimate three common econometric models: ordinary least squares (OLS), regression discontinuity (RD), and proportional hazard. While the models vary with respect to technical implementation, they share the same basic function, which is that they can be used to compare the outcomes of motions with high and low reporting time.

5.2 Econometric Models & Estimating Equations

First, I address the effects of the six-month list on what is perhaps the most common measure of judicial efficiency: mean time until disposition. In particular, I would like to know whether exposure to the six-month list causes motions to be adjudicated more quickly. I begin with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model of the following general form:

$$\text{Months Until Disposition}_{ijt}^{\bar{T}} = \alpha + \theta \text{Reporting Time}_{ijt} + \mathbf{X}_{ijt}'B + \rho t + \lambda_t + \mu_j + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

where $\text{Months Until Disposition}_{ijt}^{\bar{T}}$ represents the total number of months that motion i filed before judge j at time t has spent pending at the time of disposition ($t = \bar{T}$). In other words, what was the motion's total duration? I regress Months Until Disposition on $\text{Reporting Time}_{ijt}$, which represents the amount of time the judge has to review the motion before it first becomes eligible for reporting on a six-month list.⁸² Included in the baseline regression are a vector of motion- and case-level controls, represented by \mathbf{X}_{ijt} , and filing date time trends and fixed effects,⁸³ represented by ρt and λ_t , respectively. These linear time trends and fixed effects allow me to control for any confounding "calendar effects" that are correlated with but unrelated to the 6-month list—for example, it is conceivable that judges simply wait until the end of a month to take action on pending motions, or perhaps they structure their schedules around holidays.

Basic case- and motion-level controls will include dummies for whether the motion was

⁸²Recall from Section 5 that "Reporting Time" is a function of motion filing date, and it is completely independent of whether the motion is ever actually reported on a 6-month list. For example, two motions filed on January 1st will both have the same amount of Reporting Time, even if one is terminated the very next day and the other is still pending months later.

⁸³In particular, my preferred specification includes filing year and day-of-month fixed effects. While I can include *either* day-of-month or month-of-year fixed effects, I cannot include both, since my variation comes entirely from the day-of-month and month-of-year combination.

filed in a case with at least one *pro se* litigant, whether the motion was filed by the plaintiff or defendant, and whether any other summary judgment motions were filed in the same case. My preferred specification includes judge fixed effects (μ_j) as well as nature-of-suit fixed effects, filing year fixed effects, and district court fixed effects.

The coefficient of interest is θ , which measures the effect of an additional month of reporting time on the total months until motion disposition. Conditional on the identifying assumptions stated above, θ represents a causal estimate of the effect of additional reporting time on total case duration.⁸⁴

One concern related to our regression analysis is that it may suffer from so-called “survivorship bias.”⁸⁵ In other words, since they are based on a dataset of *completed motions*, my estimates may be biased by my inability to observe motions that are still pending at the time of my data collection. I therefore choose to complement my OLS with a Cox proportional hazards model. A proportional hazards model will allow us to estimate the effect of motion reporting time on the *rate* at which motions are resolved. In addition to addressing concerns of survivorship bias, this strategy will allow me to leverage current data on still-pending summary judgment motions, which will substantially increase my sample size.⁸⁶

While the above models provide an obvious starting place for our analysis, they fail to take advantage of one of the most distinctive features of the six-month list, which is the “jump” in reporting time that occurs on both March 1st and August 30th. Recall from Figure 4 that, while motions filed in the final days of February and August enjoy little more than seven months of reporting time, motions filed on or immediately after March 1st and August 30th enjoy almost thirteen months of reporting time. This natural discontinuity in

⁸⁴Equation 1 assumes that the effect of reporting time is constant (i.e., that each additional month of reporting time has the same treatment effect), but this may not be the case. In order to test this assumption, I will also estimate a model with separate coefficients for each month of reporting time.

$$\text{Months Until Disposition}_{ijt}^{\overline{T}} = \alpha + \sum_{q=8}^{13} \beta_q \mathbb{1}[q < \text{Reporting Time}_{ijt} \leq q + 1] + \mathbf{X}'_{ijt}B + \rho t + \lambda_t + \mu_j + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (2)$$

⁸⁵The term “survivorship bias” may be somewhat misleading in our context, since the survivors are those motions that have been fully adjudicated.

⁸⁶My basic proportional hazard model takes the following form:

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda_0(t) \exp(\beta \text{Reporting Time}_{ijt} + \mathbf{X}'_{ijt}\Gamma), \quad (3)$$


where $\lambda(t)$ represents the Cox hazard function, Y_{idt} denotes the amount of time before case i filed in district d on date t becomes eligible for publication on a 6-month list, and \mathbf{X}_{idt} is a vector of case-specific controls. The coefficient of interest is β , which reflects the effect of additional review time (i.e. less exposure to the six-month rule) on the log of the hazard ratio.

reporting time motivates the use of a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design. An RD-style model is frequently used to study the effects of some policy or intervention when the policy is applied on the basis of some “cutoff” or “threshold” score. Here, by comparing motions filed just prior to March 1st and August 30th with those filed on or just after the cutoff dates, I can obtain causal estimates of the effect of exposure to the six-month list on the speed of adjudication. The RD procedure can be expressed in a slightly simplified form with the following equation:

$$\text{Months Until Disposition}_{ijt}^{\overline{T}} = \alpha + \beta \text{Non-Reportable}_{ijt} + f(t) + \epsilon_{ijt}, \quad (4)$$

where $\text{Non-Reportable}_{ijt} = \mathbb{1}(f(t) \geq 0)$. The function $f(t)$ is a “running variable” that measures the distance between the motion’s actual filing date and the two filing dates with maximum reporting time (i.e. March 1st and August 30th). The function is slightly negative for motions filed just before March 1st or August 30th and slightly positive for motions filed just after those dates. This can be seen graphically in Figure 7, below, which plots the running variable $f(t)$ as a function of filing date. Since the filing date cut-offs are semi-annual, no day of the year is more than approximately ninety days distant from the nearest cutoff, and the running variable therefore varies between -90 and 90.

Figure 7: **Running Variable as a Function of Filing Date**



Regression discontinuity designs are subject to a few specific identifying assumptions. In particular, the key assumption of an RD design is that the underlying conditional expectation functions $\mathbb{E}[Y_i(1)|X]$ and $\mathbb{E}[Y_i(0)|X]$ are continuous across the cutoff in the forcing

variable X .⁸⁷ In my setting, this is equivalent to saying that unobservable factors are continuously related to the running variable $f(t)$, including at the cutoff dates. While there is no direct test for this “continuity assumption,” it is likely to be met when the distribution of observed baseline covariates do not change discontinuously at the threshold.⁸⁸ In fact, as shown in Appendix Table 13, several baseline covariates do appear to be distributed continuously at the threshold.⁸⁹

A related assumption of RD designs is that agents do not have precise control over the running variable. In other words, it must be that agents cannot “manipulate” their treatment status. Here, the running variable is a function of the motion filing date, which litigants obviously *can* manipulate. However, for the reasons stated above, I argue that litigants do not have *precise* control over their filing date; or, at the very least, they do not manipulate their filing date in order to take advantage of the timing of the six-month list. This proposition is supported by Figures 8a and 8b, which show the empirical distribution of summary judgment motion filings by filing date, where the filing date has been transformed into the RD running variable $f(t)$. Figure 8a shows the raw distribution of motion filing dates, while Figure 8b shows the adjusted distribution after controlling for dummies for the first, fifteenth, and last day of each month. If there were manipulation of the running variable, then we might expect to see bunching of summary judgment motions filed immediately before, on, or immediately after the cutoff. While both figures continue to show the same bi-weekly spikes that were observable in Figure 5, there does not appear to be any unusual bunching at or near the cutoff dates.⁹⁰ A more formal test of manipulation using the method outlined by McCrary (2008) similarly fails to reject the null hypothesis of no

⁸⁷Guido W. Imbens & Thomas Lemieux, *Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice*, 142 J. ECONOMETRICS 615, 618 (2008).


⁸⁸David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, *Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics*, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 281, 292 (2010).

⁸⁹As Catherine Hausman and David S. Rapson demonstrate in a recent article, the regression discontinuity design is subject to several unique pitfalls when time is used as the running variable. Catherine Hausman & David S. Rapson, *Regression Discontinuity in Time: Considerations for Empirical Applications*, 10 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 533 (2018). In particular, the “regression discontinuity in time” (or “RDiT”) approach is conceptually and practically distinct from the traditional cross-sectional regression discontinuity design because it typically relies on time-series variation for identification. As a result, the RDiT design often leverages observations far from the threshold and often ignores autoregression in the data generating process. Moreover, since time is uniformly distributed, McCrary tests are often irrelevant in an RDiT context. I argue that my context actually shares more in common with a conventional cross-sectional RD than it does with an RDiT. In particular, since hundreds or thousands of motions can be filed each day, I am able to leverage a great deal of cross-sectional variation close to the threshold. Moreover, since *motion filings* are not uniformly distributed across time, and because I argue that filing dates are locally random in the neighborhood of the threshold, manipulation tests continue to be highly relevant.

⁹⁰That is, although there is some bunching directly at the cutoffs, the bunching appears to be approximately identical to the bunching that occurs throughout the year on an approximately bi-weekly basis.

manipulation.⁹¹⁹²

Figure 8: Distribution of Motion Filings by RD Running Variable



It is worth noting one challenge related to RD designs, which stems from the fact that they rely on a narrow window of datapoints in close proximity to the cutoff point. As a result, RD models frequently lack the statistical power to detect small effects.

The models described above allow me to explore the effect of the six-month list on the speed with which motions are adjudicated. But in addition to speed, I am also interested in the six-month list's effects on the *quality* of adjudication. Intuitively, if exposure to the six-month list causes a judge to adjudicate a motion more quickly, it may also affect *how* she disposes of the motion. Quality is an admittedly vague concept, and it can mean many things in the context of civil adjudication. From current and future litigants' perspective, quality may refer to the degree of substantive or procedural fairness accorded to the parties. From the court administrator's perspective, quality may refer to the efficient allocation of judicial resources. Neither notion of quality is easy to measure, nor are they entirely distinct. As preliminary evidence of quality effects, I will look for whether the six-month list had any effect on motion-level outcomes. In particular, I will ask whether motions that were more exposed to the six-month list were either more or less likely to be granted, denied, or granted in part, and whether they were more or less likely to result in a judgment favorable to either the plaintiff or the defendant. Intuitively, if the only effect of the six-month list was

⁹¹Justin McCrary, *Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design: A Density Test*, 142 J. ECONOMETRICS 698 (2008).

⁹²At least in theory, it could be that different types of litigants have different strategic incentives. For example, perhaps plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits like to draw out litigation in order to reach a settlement, in which case they file when reporting time is high, whereas defendants want a quick resolution, so they file when reporting time is low. If these two tendencies balance one another out, then in the aggregate, it might appear as if there is no manipulation. I can begin to account for this by running separate manipulation tests on different sub-samples of my data.

to expedite adjudications, then we would not expect to see any change in motion outcomes. While these indicators provide little in the way of a priori evidence for effects on quality—since it is impossible to say how these motions should have been decided in the first place, it is hard to say whether the result was higher or lower quality decisions—they are at least somewhat probative. In addition to the above outcomes, I will also ask whether motions that were more exposed to the six-month list were either more or less likely to result in an appeal, and whether there was an effect on the outcome of the appeal (e.g. whether the Court of Appeals affirmed, reversed, or remanded to the district court). These outcomes are slightly easier to interpret. While we cannot say whether a motion should or should have not been appealed, it is uncontroversial to say that a goal of the justice system is to reduce the need for appeals. Moreover, reversals and remands offer fairly direct evidence that the district court’s initial judgment was either improper or inadequate.

Empirically, the goal will be to identify the causal effect of exposure to the six-month list on the likelihood of various motion-level and appellate outcomes. Specifically, I estimate a linear probability model identical in form to equation (1), except that the left-hand-side variable is replaced with a dummy variable for the outcome (e.g., whether or not the motion was granted). In order to test my linear specification, I will also conduct robustness checks with Logit and Probit models, which allow for a non-linear relationship between reporting time and the likelihood of a particular outcome. Finally, I will also use the regression discontinuity specification from equation (4) in order to look for evidence of an effect on motion-level outcomes in the vicinity of the reporting time discontinuities.


6 Results & Discussion

6.1 How Does the Six-Month List Affect the Speed of Adjudication?

I first present evidence of the effect of relative exposure to the six-month list on the speed of adjudication. Without even introducing the regression results, a single graph makes the key point: summary judgment motions that are most exposed to the six-month list are adjudicated much more quickly. Figure 9 shows kernel density plots of the empirical distributions of motion duration by relative reporting time. The blue curve corresponds to motions with low (fewer than eight months) reporting time, and the red curve corresponds to motions with high (greater than twelve months) reporting time. What stands out is that

motions with low reporting time are considerably more likely to be adjudicated in fewer than ten months. While the modal motion duration for low-reporting-time motions is fewer than six months, there appears to be something like a bi-modal distribution, with the second peak at approximately eight months—that is, exactly when the motions are due for the six-month list. In fact, the high-reporting-time motions follow a similar distribution, except that the distribution appears to be stretched out over a larger interval. While the modal motion duration for high-reporting-time motions is fewer than six months, the second peak now occurs at approximately twelve months—again, exactly when the motions are due for the six-month list.

Figure 9: **Distribution of Motion Duration, by Relative Reporting Time**



Next we consider the regression results, which allows us to quantify the effect observed in Figure 9. Table 6.1 presents OLS estimates of equation (1). Columns (1)-(4) correspond to various combinations of controls. We will focus on column (4), which includes various linear time trends (for day of year, day of quarter, and day of month), district*year fixed effects, and day-of-month fixed effects, but the results are robust across specifications. Column (4) tells us that, on average, each additional month of reporting time corresponds to ~ 0.13 additional months of total motion duration. Extrapolating linearly, since the least exposed motions enjoy an additional six months of reporting time relative to the most exposed motions, we can infer that the most exposed motions are adjudicated approximately

Table 4: Effect of Reporting Time on Months Until Motion Disposition
Summary Judgment Motions, All Civil Cases, (2004-2014)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Months until Report	0.129*** (0.005)	0.133*** (0.005)	0.132*** (0.005)	0.132*** (0.005)
Observations	206,187	206,187	206,151	206,151
Case & Motion Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar Trends		Yes	Yes	Yes
District*Year FEs			Yes	Yes
Day-of-Month FEs				Yes
Mean of Dep. Variable	5.36	5.36	5.36	5.36
Mean of Indep. Var	10.03	10.03	10.03	10.03

This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of additional reporting time on months until motion disposition. Reporting time is measured in the number of months between the day on which a motion was filed and the earliest possible date on which it could appear on a CJRA 6-month report. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

0.8 months sooner than those that are least exposed. Compared to the mean summary judgment motion duration of 5.36 months, this represents a nearly 15% effect.

Of course, from the perspective of both the litigants and the court administrators, one might suspect that what really matters is time until overall *case* disposition, and not merely time until motion disposition. In fact, here too we see substantial effects on the speed of justice. Table 6.1 presents OLS results where we replace the left-hand-side of equation (1) with months until overall case disposition. The variation on the right-hand-side still comes from the motion-level reporting time. The OLS results indicate that, on average, each additional month of summary judgment *motion* reporting time corresponds to ~ 0.08 additional months of total *case* duration. Once again multiplying this effect by six, it appears that, when a summary judgment motion is most exposed to the six-month list, the overall case of which it is a part lasts approximately half a month longer. Compared to the mean case disposition time of 23.37 months, represents more than a 2% effect.

One might question the assumption of linearity—that is, does each additional month of reporting time really have the same effect on the speed of adjudication? The answer is that, while the relationship between reporting time and speed of motion adjudication may not be quite linear, it is at least monotonically increasing. Appendix Figure 2 plots the coefficients β_q from the non-parametric model in equation (2). Whereas motions with between eight and nine months of reporting time last only about 0.14 months longer than motions with

Table 5: Effect of Motion Reporting Time on Months Until Case Disposition
Summary Judgment Motions, All Civil Cases, (2004-2014)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Months until Report	0.062*** (0.018)	0.082*** (0.019)	0.086*** (0.019)	0.080*** (0.019)
Observations	183923	183923	183887	183887
Case & Motion Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar Trends		Yes	Yes	Yes
District*Year FEs			Yes	Yes
Day-of-Month FEs				Yes
Mean of Dep. Variable	23.38	23.38	23.37	23.37
Mean of Indep. Var	10.04	10.04	10.04	10.04

This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of additional motion reporting time on months until overall case disposition. Reporting time is measured in the number of months between the day on which a motion was filed and the earliest possible date on which it could appear on a CJRA 6-month report. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


less than eight months of reporting time, motions with between twelve and thirteen months of reporting time last more than 0.7 months longer.

The results in Table 6.1 and Figure 14a are estimated from a sample of approximately 206,000 summary judgment motions. By construction, in order to know their final duration, the motions in this sample had to be fully adjudicated. As discussed in section 5, a proportional hazard model (like the one shown in equation (3)) allows us to leverage the full sample of nearly 500,000 motions, whether or not they have been fully adjudicated. The proportional hazards model therefore alleviates any concerns over survivorship bias. In fact, Appendix Table 9.3 shows that the effect of the six-month list on motion duration are equally apparent in a proportional hazards model. In particular, the hazard rate of motion disposition decreases significantly with each additional month of reporting time. In other words, motions that are less exposed to the six-month list are disposed of at a slower rate.

Next we consider results from the regression discontinuity design. Recall from Figure 4 that motions experience a large, discontinuous jump in reporting time on March 1st and August 30th. Motions filed just one day prior enjoy only seven months of reporting time compared to thirteen months of reporting time for motions filed on or immediately after those dates. If reporting time is as influential for motion duration as I argue it is, then we would expect to see a similarly discontinuous jump in motion duration at the same

filing date cutoffs. In fact, that is exactly what we see. Figure 10, which plots predicted values from a local linear regression against a scatter plot of actual average motion duration, indicates a substantial jump in average motion duration precisely at the cutoff dates. Table 6.1 quantifies this effect. While the estimates vary according to modeling assumptions and chosen bandwidths, the results are roughly consistent with the inferences we made from the OLS models. Namely, the most exposed motions are adjudicated up to 0.8 months faster than those that are least exposed to the six-month list.

Figure 10: **Average Months Until Motion Disposition
by RD Running Variable**



6.2 How Does the Six-Month List Affect the Quality of Adjudication?

So far we have seen widespread evidence that the six-month list does indeed expedite the adjudication of summary judgment motions. This result is consistent with the notion that judges may believe their future career prospects partially depend on compliance with the six-month list. But what does exposure to the six-month list entail for the *quality* of adjudication? Recall from section 3 that our predictions for adjudicative quality will likely depend upon the model that we have of judicial behavior. Judge's concern for their future career prospects is enough to predict an impact on the speed of adjudication, but it may not tell us much about the impact on the quality of adjudication. The model predicts that whether

Table 6: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Effect of Reporting Time on Average Months Until Disposition

	Parametric			Non-Parametric (Local Linear)	
	(1) Linear	(2) Quadratic	(3) Cubic	(4) IK Bandwidth	(5) CCT Bandwidth
Filed After Cutoff	0.849*** [0.039]	0.753*** [0.054]	0.630*** [0.073]	0.624*** [0.198]	0.363*** [0.111]
Mean of Dep. Variable	5.36	5.36	5.36	5.22	5.26
Observations	204137	204137	204137	6826	51247

This table presents regression discontinuity (RD) estimates of the effect of additional reporting time on total motion duration. The running variable represents the motion filing date relative to the six-month list eligibility cutoff. Motions filed just before the cutoff are eligible for the current six month list, whereas motions filed just after the cutoff have an additional six months before they might appear on a list. Columns (1)-(3) are estimated parametrically with linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomials, respectively. Columns (4)-(5) are estimated nonparametrically with local linear regressions, using the IK and CCT methods of optimal bandwidth selection, respectively. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

judges tend to compromise quality for speed is likely to turn on a number of factors, including: 1) the degree to which judges procrastinate, 2) the degree to which judges feel rewarded for the amount of care and effort they invest in motions, and 3) the substitutability of speed and quality.

In fact, I find only mixed evidence to suggest that exposure to the six-month list affects how judges dispose of the summary judgment motions before them. At most, the effects appear to small. Table 6.2 presents linear probability model estimates of the effect of additional six-month list reporting time on various motion-level and appellate outcomes.⁹³⁹⁴ Since the legal significance of these outcomes is likely to depend upon which party filed the motion—a summary judgment filed by the defendant is more likely to be fully dispositive of the entire case, for example—I choose to restrict the sample to motions filed by the defendant, which are more common.

What is immediately apparent is that, in comparison to the effects on the speed of adjudication, the effects on motion and appellate outcomes are small and relatively imprecisely estimated. We do observe what appear to be modest effects on summary judgment grant rates—for each additional month of reporting time, motions are approximately 0.19

⁹³More detailed results, including robustness to various model specifications, are presented in Appendix tables 9.3 and 9.3.

⁹⁴It should be noted that columns (3)-(5), which report appellate outcomes, are conditioned on the outcome of the motion itself—that is, whether the district court granted, denied, granted-in-part, or otherwise disposed of the motion. Since appeals are more likely to be filed when a summary judgment motion is granted, and since the Court of Appeals is more likely to affirm when a summary judgment motion has been granted, the conditional effects reported in columns (3)-(5) tell us whether there is something else about motions with greater reporting time that make them more or less likely to result in a particular appellate outcome.

Table 7: Effect of Motion Reporting Time on Probability of Selected Motion & Appellate Outcomes
Motions Filed by Defendants

	Motion Outcomes			Appellate Outcomes		
	(1) Granted	(2) Denied	(3) Granted In Part	(4) Appealed	(5) Affirmed	(6) Reversed
Months until Report	0.0019** [0.0008]	-0.0009 [0.0007]	-0.0006 [0.0007]	0.0003 [0.0006]	0.0018 [0.0017]	-0.0013 [0.0009]
Observations	131,406	131,406	131,406	131,406	34,390	34,390
Case & Motion Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District*Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day-of-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Motion Outcome Dummies				Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean of Dep. Variable	.57	.26	.16	.26	.53	.08
Mean of Indep. Var	10.03	10.03	10.03	10.03	10.04	10.04

This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of additional reporting time on probability of various motion-level outcomes for summary judgment motions filed by a defendant. Reporting time is measured in the number of months between the day on which a motion was filed and the earliest possible date on which it could appear on a CJRA 6-month report. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

percentage points likely to be granted—but the estimate is only marginally significant. This result is robust to various specifications of the OLS model, and it is also robust to the choice of Logit and Probit models. While the point estimate is small, when put in the proper context, it does appear to be somewhat meaningful. At first glance, this may seem like a small effect, but in context, it is meaningful. Given that the least exposed motions enjoy six months of additional reporting time compared to the most exposed motions, and given that on average 57% of motions are granted, this amounts to a 2% effect on the summary judgment grant rate.

The judicial multitasking model discussed in section 3 predicts an effect on the grant rate and other motion-level outcomes, but it does not predict the sign (either positive or negative) or magnitude of these effects. Nonetheless, the observed effect on the summary judgment grant rate makes some intuitive sense. Summary judgments are dispositive motions. Whereas an order granting summary judgment often disposes of the case altogether, an order denying, granting in part, or otherwise dismissing a summary judgment typically allows the parties to live to fight another day. Judges may therefore view orders to deny, grant in part, or moot as more conservative courses of action. Moreover, the decision to grant the motion may simply entail more work. While Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that judges must “state on the record the reasons for granting or deny-

ing the motion,”⁹⁵ judges typically only write lengthy decisions when they are granting the summary judgment.⁹⁶ As a result, judges who are under pressure to meet a deadline imposed by the six-month list may choose to deny or dismiss the motion in order to avoid the extra risk and extra work associated with an order to grant.⁹⁷

The results on appellate outcomes are even less pronounced. It does appear that judgments in cases where the summary judgment motion was relatively unexposed to the six-month list (i.e. with greater reporting time) may be slightly more likely to be affirmed by an appeals court (conditional on appeal), but the effect is small and statistically insignificant.

In contrast to the results on the speed of adjudication, none of the results on motion-level or appellate outcomes are detectable using the regression discontinuity design. Appendix figure 15 presents regression discontinuity plots of selected outcome variables, and appendix tables 9.3 and 6.1 present corresponding RD estimates; the plots show no discernible discontinuities at the reporting time cutoffs. This should give us some pause with respect to the OLS results presented above. Taken together with OLS results reported in Table 6.2, the RD results suggest that, insofar as the six-month list has any effect on motion outcomes, the effect is very small.

As a final piece of evidence on the quality of adjudications, I consider how exposure to the six-month list affects the speed of overall case dispositions. We have already seen (in Table 6.1 and elsewhere) that exposure to the six-month list tends to expedite motion dispositions. Moreover, as shown by Table 6.1, faster motion processing does indeed translate into faster case processing. However, it is striking that the coefficients presented in Table 6.1 are quite a bit smaller than the coefficients presented in Table 6.1. In other words, it appears that a month saved in the summary judgment phase *does not* translate into a full month of savings in overall case disposition time.

This observation motivates the following exercise, which attempts to dig more deeply into how the six-month list affects overall case processing. We can think of the six-month list as having two types of effects on overall case processing. First, there is the “direct” ef-

⁹⁵Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

⁹⁶Nancy Gertner, *Losers’ Rules*, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 (2012), <http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/losers-rules>.

⁹⁷That the effects on orders to deny, grant in part, and moot are all small and statistically insignificant may reflect the fact that, whereas all three courses of action allow the case to proceed in one way or another, only the order to grant fully disposes of case. In other words, the opposite of an order to grant is not simply an order to deny, but rather any order *other than* an order to grant. If the effect is dispersed across all three courses of action, then any one of these effects will be smaller and more difficult to detect with statistical precision.

fect on motion processing. Ordinarily, the sooner a motion is decided, the sooner the overall case is decided. If all that mattered were the direct effect, then we would anticipate a one-for-one relationship between time until motion disposition and time until case disposition. However, the six-month list may also have “indirect” effects on case processing. The effects could go in either direction. For example, if exposure to the six-month list caused judges to resolve certain factual or legal questions in a way that narrows issues still in dispute, then that might tend to expedite the trial phase of the proceeding, even after the summary judgment phase has been decided. If that were the case, then a month saved in the summary judgment phase might actually translate to more than a month saved in overall case disposition time. Alternatively, if exposure to the six-month list causes the judge to “cut corners” during the summary judgment phase—for example, postponing certain factual or legal questions until later in the course of proceedings—then we might expect a month saved in the summary judgment phase may not translate into more than a full month of savings in overall case disposition time. In fact, if judges tend to reallocate work in an inefficient manner (e.g., postponing the resolution of some question until later in the proceedings when it is more time-consuming to resolve), then a month saved in the summary judgment phase may even translate into *less* than a month saved in overall case disposition time.

Column (1) of Table 6.2 reproduces the main result from column (1) of Table 6.1. Recall that the regression is based on equation (1), except that the left-hand-side variable is not months until motion disposition, but rather months until case disposition. Column (1) shows that, on average, each additional month of summary judgment *motion* reporting time corresponds to ~ 0.08 additional months of total *case* duration. But how of that effect is attributable to the “direct” effect on motion processing, and how much is attribute to “indirect” effects on other aspects of the case proceedings? Columns (2) and (3) attempt to decompose the overall effect into its constituent parts. Column (2) copies the specification from column (1), except that it controls for duration of the motion itself. This effectively controls for the direct effect, so that any remaining coefficient on reporting time must be attributable to the indirect effect. What we see is that, after controlling for the direct effect on motion disposition time, each additional month of reporting time reduces overall case duration by an average of 0.052 months. In other words, controlling for the direct effect on motion disposition time, cases that are most exposed to the six-month list actually last *longer*

than cases that are least exposed. Column (3) shows that these indirect effects persist even after controlling for motion-level outcomes (i.e. whether the motion was granted, granted in part, etc., and whether an appeal was filed subsequent to motion disposition). Table 6.2 suggests that, although the six-month list is effective at expediting motion processing, the six-month list may also have the perverse effect of encouraging certain inefficient practices that tend to dampen the overall effect on case dispositions is somewhat. I interpret this as evidence that the six-month list may indeed cause judges to inefficiently “cut corners.”

Table 8: Effect of Motion Reporting Time on Months Until Case Disposition
Controlling for Direct Effect on Motion Duration

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Months until Report	0.080*** (0.019)	-0.052*** (0.017)	-0.048*** (0.018)
Months until Motion Disposition		1.035*** (0.010)	1.001*** (0.010)
Motion Granted			-2.740*** (0.074)
Motion Granted in Part			1.874*** (0.106)
Motion Mooted			-1.796*** (0.170)
Appeal Filed			3.147*** (0.081)
Observations	183,887	183,887	183,887
Case & Motion Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
District*Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day-of-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean of Dep. Variable	23.38	23.38	23.38
Mean of Indep. Var	10.04	10.04	10.04

This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of additional motion reporting time on months until overall case disposition. Reporting time is measured in the number of months between the day on which a motion was filed and the earliest possible date on which it could appear on a CJRA 6-month report. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

In future work I intend to investigate other proxies for judicial quality, including the frequency, content, and citation rates of written judicial opinions. I hope that these proxies will offer more insight into the how and why the six-month list affects adjudicative quality.

6.3 Do Judges Respond Heterogeneously?

Finally, I conclude this section by presenting evidence that judges exhibit a great deal of heterogeneity in their responsiveness to the six-month list. Table 6.3 presents results from OLS regressions that are similar to equation (2) except that they interact reporting time with selected judge traits, including whether the judge was under fifty-five years old at the time of the motion filing, whether the judge is non-white, whether the judge is a woman, whether the judge was serving as the Chief Judge of her district at the time of the motion filing, and whether the judge was appointed by a president of the same party as the current President at the time of the motion filing. All regressions include judge fixed effects, and where the trait in question varies with time, the uninteracted judge trait is also included.

Table 9: Effect of Reporting Time on Months Until Motion Disposition
by Judge Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Months until Report	0.128*** (0.006)	0.126*** (0.006)	0.131*** (0.006)	0.135*** (0.006)	0.133*** (0.007)
Reporting Time * Judge Under 55	0.041*** (0.014)				
Reporting Time * Non-White Judge		0.059*** (0.016)			
Reporting Time * Female Judge			0.023* (0.013)		
Reporting Time * Chief Judge				0.006 (0.017)	
Reporting Time * Same-party Judge					0.007 (0.011)
Observations	170,950	170,950	170,950	170,950	170,950
Case & Motion Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District*Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day-of-Month FEs					
Mean of Dep. Variable	5.44	5.44	5.44	5.44	5.44
Mean of Indep. Var	10.03	10.03	10.03	10.03	10.03

This table presents OLS estimates of the heterogeneous effects of additional reporting time on months until motion disposition for various judge characteristics, including whether the judge is under 55 years old, non-white, female, whether the judge is the Chief Judge of a district court, and whether the judge was appointed by a President of the same party as the current President at the time of the motion filing. Reporting time is measured in the number of months between the day on which a motion was filed and the earliest possible date on which it could appear on a CJRA 6-month report. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects. Where the judge characteristic is time-varying (e.g. judge's age, or whether judge is of same party as the President), the un-interacted judge characteristic is also included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

I cautiously interpret these results as being broadly consistent with a model of career concerns, where judges are motivated to comply with the six-month list in order to enhance their opportunities for promotion. In fact, there are at least two explanations for why a career concerns-style model might lead to heterogeneity across dimensions including judges' age, race, and gender. The first story is slightly more uplifting, at least for those who care about diversity on the bench and equity in the workplace. Specifically, I argue that the observed heterogeneity may be driven by recent efforts to diversify the federal bench. Although the federal judiciary remains far more white and male than the American public overall (men represent 73% of Article III judges, and more than 80% of Article III judges are white/non-Hispanic, compared to the approximately 61% of Americans who are white/non-Hispanic)⁹⁸, the judiciary has grown more diverse in recent years, especially under President Obama. When the push to nominate a diverse pool of judges is combined with the current low baseline level of diversity in the judiciary, judges who are members of underrepresented minorities (namely, women and people of color) may perceive enhanced prospects for promotion. When prospects for promotion are more salient, judges are likely to be especially sensitive to the six-month list.⁹⁹

However, a more pernicious story of workplace discrimination could also explain the pattern of observed heterogeneity. Specifically, it is possible that young, female, and racial/ethnic-minority judges simply need to do more and higher quality work in order to receive the same level of recognition as their white/male peers. If that is the case, then the returns to compliance with the six-month list are simply greater for judges who are members of these under-represented minorities. This, too, would explain greater sensitivity to the six-month list among young, non-white, and female judges.

In future work I intend to exploit additional variation in the likelihood of promotion—including variation in judicial vacancies on the Courts of Appeals—in order to further investigate how career concerns interact with individual traits including race, gender, and age. I also hope to further evaluate the competing explanations for heterogeneous career concerns.

⁹⁸Data on judge demographics available at <https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/demography-article-iii-judges-1789-2017-introduction>.

⁹⁹This hypothesis depends upon whether we view under-represented minority status and compliance with the six-month list as either substitutes or complements with respect to the likelihood of promotion. I speculate that they are much more likely to be complements. That is, the probability of promotion is increasing in both under-represented minority status *and* compliance with administrative deadlines, and the presence of one quality does not diminish the returns to the other.

7 Discussion: What Can the Six-Month List Tell Us About Effective Civil Justice Reform?

The preceding empirical analysis reveals that social sanctions do indeed provide effective incentives, even among workers as elite and highly insulated as federal judges. However, my analysis also reveals that speedier adjudications may come at a cost. I find suggestive evidence that the six-month list may influence not only when judges do their work, but also *how* they do it, and it may cause judges to inefficiently cut corners. But what does this mean for optimal civil justice policy? In particular, what does the preceding analysis tell us about optimal judicial incentive schemes?

If nothing else, my analysis suggests that the six-month list would likely benefit from several minor tweaks. My analysis indicates that the six-month list suffers from two major deficiencies. First, even insofar as the six-month list is effective, motions and cases vary arbitrarily in their exposure to the list, and judges vary widely in their responsiveness to the list. The six-month list would benefit from reforms aimed at making its effects more uniform across motions, cases, and judges. Second, while the six-month list does indeed accomplish its ostensible goal of promoting speedy adjudications, it also appears to have unintended consequences for the quality of adjudication. An additional set of reforms should aim to reduce judges' incentives to cut corners.

7.1 Ensuring uniformity of judicial incentives

At present, motions vary enormously in their exposure to the six-month list. While judges have just seven months to review some motions before they appear on a six-month list, other motions enjoy nearly thirteen months of reporting time. While this variation is a boon to economists, who are always on the lookout for a good natural experiment, from the standpoint of judicial policy, this variation is sub-optimal. Variation in exposure to the six-month list creates unpredictability, and for especially savvy judges and attorneys, it does create opportunities for strategic behavior.¹⁰⁰

One solution to the problem of non-uniformity would be to use a continuously-updating six-month list. In other words, motions and certain cases pending for six-months or longer

¹⁰⁰This would, of course, violate my identifying assumption that litigants *do not* file strategically. While this assumption does appear to be met at present, as litigants and judges learn more about the six-month list, there is no guarantee that they would not learn to file or schedule motions strategically in the future.

would be added to a publicly available website at the end of each business day. Under this system, all cases would benefit equally from the judicial incentives for a speedy resolution, and judges would also have less opportunity to prioritize some cases while neglecting others. One potential pitfall of the continuously-updating list, however, is that it may become less salient to judges and other court observers. The current CJRA reporting system has the benefit of focusing attention on the two semi-annual reports. The semi-annual reporting dates help to coordinate behavior. Policymakers, members of Congress, and the especially-interested layperson know to check the report on or after these dates, and judges know there is a high likelihood that the report will be read. If, on the other hand, a new list is published each day, then the public may become inured, and judges may feel less social pressure as a result.

Another solution would be to maintain the current system of two reports per year, but to incorporate an element of randomness into the process. For example, if reports were published on 2-3 randomly selected dates per year, then judges might respond as if the reports are continuously updating.

Finally, my preferred solution to the non-uniformity problem would be to incorporate *aggregate* statistics into the current six-month lists. That is, in addition to (or even instead of) reporting *currently* overdue motions and cases, Congress¹⁰¹ should consider calling on the Administrative Office to also report semiannual judge-specific aggregate statistics, like how many motions were pending for six-months or longer at any point in the prior six months, average time-until-disposition for different types of motions, etc. This proposal is somewhat similar to proposals for “income averaging,” which have gained favor among some tax scholars in recent years.¹⁰² This proposal has the advantage of not only reducing variation in exposure to the six-month list, but it also avoids penalizing judges who take on unusually complex cases. Even if a judge is slow to dispose of one or two particularly complex cases, her peers can nonetheless discern from her aggregate statistics that the slowness is not part of an overall tendency for slowness.

¹⁰¹ From a practical point of view, whether a particular amendment to the reporting requirements necessitates Congressional action is likely to depend upon whether judges view the amendment as bolstering or eroding their judicial independence. See, e.g., Jeffrey Peck, *Users United: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990*, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 118 (1991). “[I]n a system where key participants have incentives to resist . . . reform, change is much more likely to occur through the force of law than through the nonbinding, hortatory proposals [of] the Judicial Conference.”

¹⁰² See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, *Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered*, 40 HARV. J. LEGIS. 395 (2003) (Arguing that income averaging avoids for income tax purposes avoids penalizing the poor, who are particularly likely to experience large and frequent income fluctuations).

7.2 Removing incentives to compromise on quality

My analysis reveals mixed evidence on the question of whether judges are sacrificing quality for speed in response to the six-month list. Nonetheless, one could imagine another set of reforms aimed at further preventing this possibility.

First, it is worth noting one feature of the six-month list that may already be mitigating some quality effects. Recall that, in addition to reporting motions that have been pending for six months or longer, the Administrative Office is also directed to publish reports on *cases* that have been pending for three years or longer.¹⁰³ Also recall, from my discussion regarding Table 6.2, that judges appear to be inefficiently deferring work until after the summary judgment phase of a given case. This is what I referred to as “cutting corners.” Insofar as the three-year list focuses attention on overall case duration, the three year list may mitigate the incentives to inefficiently postpone work until a later phase of the case. In other words, the three-year list may have the effect of reducing judicial myopia. More research should be done on the effects of the three-year list, but it may offer a road map for future improvements to the six-month list. Insofar as the three-year list is effective at reducing myopia, it may be beneficial to reduce its horizon, perhaps even reporting on cases that have been pending two years or longer. Of course, since the three-year list may have its own unintended consequences, broad policy recommendations are inadvisable until further research has been conducted.

The CJRA might also benefit from a reporting scheme that takes into account a broader set of metrics, including metrics unrelated to speed. According to the multitask model previewed in section 3 (and further specified in appendix section 9.1), the tendency to compromise on quality stems from disparities between competing goals (e.g. speed, fairness, and accuracy) with respect to both monitoring costs and the power of incentives. In other words, since speed is more easily monitored than quality, *and* since the six-month list rewards speed but not quality, judges may compromise quality. While quality is inherently hard to monitor, recent scholarship has sought to measure it. For example, a recent article by Judge William Young of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts and Professor Jordan Singer discusses the measurement of judicial productivity.¹⁰⁴ In particular, they

¹⁰³Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 103, 28 U.S.C. § 476 (2012).

¹⁰⁴Hon. William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, *Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete Model of Federal District Court Productivity*, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 55 (2013); *see also* Jordan M. Singer & Hon. William G. Young, *Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at Federal District Court Productivity*, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565 (2014).

propose a new metric for procedural fairness, which they call “bench presence.” Bench presence measures the time that a district judge spends on the bench, actively presiding over cases. By incorporating more holistic measures of adjudicative quality into the CJRA’s judicial reporting scheme, we may eliminate some of the incentive to sacrifice quality for the sake of speed.

Of course, the inherent danger of including additional metrics in the six-month list is that those metrics will simply create new biases in judicial behavior. Moreover, at least as a matter of public perception, monitoring judges on *how* they decide matters before them—and not merely on *when*—may be interpreted by some as an unacceptable intrusion into judicial independence. One possibility, which requires more research, is to include ostensibly “neutral” metrics. These metrics would be intended not to convey some notion of “quality,” but rather to simply indicate that something may be amiss. In other words, these metrics would serve as the “canary in the coal mine.” For example, we may not have a strong prior for whether judges should be qualifying more or fewer expert witnesses, but if we observe that a particular judge is a major outlier, that may be an indication that the judge is compromising on some aspect of adjudicative quality. Additional research would be necessary in order to identify which metrics, if any, are ideal for reporting. Still, this too could raise concerns, not least of which is the erosion of judicial independence.

In future drafts I intend to explore further solutions to the potential for adverse effects on judicial quality. I also intend to explore how to address the observed heterogeneity across judges (including along dimensions of age, race, and gender), and I intend to consider much broader reforms outside of the narrow confines of the six-month list.

8 Conclusion

This paper presents one of the first empirical analyses of the causal effects of the six-month list on the speed and quality of civil adjudication. Aided by an original large-N motion-level dataset and a novel identification strategy based on quasi-random variation in exposure to the six-month list, I uncover two important findings. First, “shaming” works. That is, the six-month list has effectively accomplished its ostensible goal of promoting speedy adjudications. Motions that are most exposed to the six-month list are adjudicated almost 15% faster than those that are least exposed, and overall cases are adjudicated almost 2% faster

as a consequence. Second, improved speed does not appear to have been achieved at a significant cost with respect to the *quality* of civil adjudications. While district court judges are slightly less likely to grant summary judgment when the motion is more exposed to the six-month list, the effect is small, marginally significant, and not robust to all specifications. Effects on appellate outcomes are similarly small and statistically insignificant. On the other hand, after controlling for the direct effect on motion processing time, it does appear that greater exposure to the six-month list actually *prolongs* overall case duration, suggesting that the six-month list may be causing judges to inefficiently “cut corners.” I interpret the above results as broadly consistent with models of judicial behavior that emphasize career concerns, procrastination, and judicial multitasking. In the previous section, I discussed the normative implications of my findings. In particular, I suggest reforms aimed both at making the effects of the six-month list more uniform across motions and cases and at mitigating the six-month list’s potential for adverse effects on adjudicative quality.

In addition to the main results, I find evidence of considerable heterogeneity across judges in their responsiveness to the six-month list. In particular, I find that young judges, non-white judges, and female judges are among the most sensitive to the six-month list. These findings, while preliminary, call attention to the ways in which non-traditional workplace incentives—here, the use of social sanctions—interact with worker characteristics like race, age, and gender.

My analysis suggests several avenues for future research. In particular, I intend to delve further into judges’ sensitivity to career concerns, with a particular emphasis on differences across race, gender, and age. I also intend to probe alternative proxies for adjudicative quality, including the frequency with which judges grant oral argument and the frequency, content, and citation rates of written judicial opinions. Moreover, insofar as the preceding analysis is limited to “within-motion” and “within-case” effects, I hope to extend my analysis to take into account spillovers across motions within a case and across cases that are on the docket of the same judge. I also intend to augment the preceding analysis with an instrumental variables approach based on the timing of pre-summary judgment milestones (e.g. when the case was filed, or when discovery was completed).

9 Appendix

9.1 Judicial Multitask Model

Suppose that the judge chooses between two actions, a_1 and a_2 , where the first action tends to expedite the case, and the second action tends to enhance procedural fairness. For example, a_1 might correspond to a pre-trial conference, and a_2 may correspond to granting additional time for discovery. Both actions are personally costly to the busy federal judge. The judge's cost function is

$$c(a_1, a_2) \tag{5}$$

where $\frac{\partial c}{\partial a_1} > 0$, $\frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial a_1^2} > 0$, and $\frac{\partial^2 c}{\partial a_2^2} > 0$. That is, the judge's private cost is increasing and convex in both actions.

These actions generate judicial output according to

$$x_1 = a_1 + \epsilon_1 \tag{6}$$

$$x_2 = a_2 + \epsilon_2, \tag{7}$$

where x_1 is inversely related to the judge's average motion processing time, and x_2 represents the substantive and the overall procedural fairness of her decisions. The individual judge's contribution to social welfare W is a function of both types of judicial output:

$$W = \phi_1 x_1 + \phi_2 x_2 \tag{8}$$

Among the most important features of the model is that, while x_1 is perfectly observable, x_2 is unobserved. That is, while the Congress and the Federal Judiciary can easily monitor a judge's average time-to-disposition as well as her disposition time on individual cases and motions, it is difficult to monitor her substantive or procedural fairness. The latter generally requires appellate review, which is both costly and subject to error in its own right.

Seeking to incentivize that which can be observed, judges are promoted with probability $p = \bar{p} + \beta x_1 + \nu$. That is, the probability of promotion increases linearly with the inverse

of the judge's average motion processing time, and β represents the strength of the judge's incentives. For example, the introduction of the 6-month list, which tends to incentivize speed, would represent an increase the value of β .

The federal district judge chooses her actions a_1 and a_2 in order to maximize her private utility from promotion net of her private costs:

$$\max_{a_1, a_2} U(a_1, a_2) = u(p(a_1, a_2)) - c(a_1, a_2), \quad (9)$$

which yields the first order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} [a_1] : \beta &= \frac{\partial c(a_1, a_2)}{\partial a_1} \\ [a_2] : \frac{\partial c(a_1, a_2)}{\partial a_2} * a_2 &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

If the cost of a_2 is always positive—that is, if $\frac{\partial c}{\partial a_2} > 0$ —then the model yields a corner solution where the judge never expends any effort at procedural fairness. Instead, suppose that $\frac{\partial c(a_1, a_2=0)}{\partial a_2} \leq 0$, yielding an interior solution. That is, as long as efforts at fairness are costless at certain minimal levels, then the judge will expend some effort in that direction. Further suppose that actions a_1 and a_2 are substitutes, so that $\frac{\partial^2 c(a_1, a_2)}{\partial a_1 \partial a_2} < 0$. This seems like a reasonable assumption, given that actions tending to enhance procedural fairness will often tend to slow down an action and make speedy disposition more costly.

The key question is how the judge's behavior (namely, her choice of actions a_1 and a_2) responds to the strength of her incentives β . Differentiating her first order conditions with respect to β yields:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial a_1^*}{\partial \beta} &> 0 \\ \frac{\partial a_2^*}{\partial \beta} &< 0 \end{aligned}$$

In other words, when x_1 is observable, x_2 is unobservable, and actions a_1 and a_2 are substitutes, high-powered incentives like the 6-month list will tend to increase investment in speed and decrease investment in procedural fairness.

9.2 Incorporating Judge Procrastination

The goal of this model is to evaluate how a present-biased responds to incentives similar to those generated by the six-month list. The model borrows much of its architecture from other models used to study the effects of final¹⁰⁵ or interim deadlines¹⁰⁶ on the behavior of present-biased agents. The six-month list, however, imposes a somewhat unique choice structure with similarities to both final and interim deadlines. The six-month list is similar to an interim deadline in the sense that it is non-binding—much like a student subject to an interim deadline for submitting a rough draft of a writing assignment, the judge is free to allocate her effort across the deadline, even if it triggers an appearance on the six-month list. However, if she chooses to discontinue her work in order to avoid an appearance on the six-month list, then her work becomes final, and it is too late to invest effort in order to improve it.

I will start by introducing a basic model of a judge subject to present-bias (i.e. procrastination). After establishing the framework, I will consider the likely effects of implementing a six-month list-style regime. Suppose a judge is required to enter an order disposing of a single motion. She has two periods $t \in \{1, 2\}$ during which to work on the order. At the end of period 1, she may choose to either continue working on the order during period 2, or she may discontinue her work and enter the order immediately. For each period that she works on the order, she chooses an effort level $e_t \geq 0$ for which she incurs a cost of $c(e_t)$ where $c'(\cdot) > 0$ and $c''(\cdot) > 0$. The judge is rewarded for her efforts in period 3, where her probability of promotion $p\left(\sum_{t=1}^2 e_t + \epsilon\right)$ is strictly increasing and in her total effort invested in the order ($p'(\cdot) > 0$; $p''(\cdot) < 0$). The noise term ϵ reflects the inherently imperfect observability of a judge's effort on any single motion. The judge's intertemporal preferences are given by a standard hyperbolic discounting utility function:

$$U_t(u_t, u_{t+1}, \dots, u_T) = u_t + \beta \sum_{\tau=t+1}^T \delta^{\tau-t} u_{\tau},$$

where u_t represents the judge's instantaneous utility in period t , $\delta \in [0, 1]$ represents a time-consistent (i.e. exponential) discount factor, and $\beta \in [0, 1]$ denotes the degree of the judge's

¹⁰⁵See, e.g., Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, *Incentives for Procrastinators*, 114 Q. J. ECON. 769 (1999).

¹⁰⁶See, e.g., Fabian Herweg & Daniel Muller, *Performance of Procrastinators: on the Value of Deadlines*, 70 THEORY & DECISION 329 (2011); Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, *Incentives and Self-Control* (2005) (unpublished working paper).

time-inconsistent present bias. For convenience, we will assume that the judge's has a time-consistent discount factor of $\delta = 1$.

First we consider a regime without the six-month list. In the first period the judge chooses an actual first-period effort level e_1 , decides whether to continue working in period 2, and conditional on choosing to continue, chooses a planned second-period effort level e_2 . The judge's first-period intertemporal utility function is given by

$$U_1 = \max \{-c(e_1) + \beta p(e_1), -c(e_1) - \beta c(e_2) + \beta p(e_1 + e_2)\}. \quad (10)$$

The judge's second-period intertemporal utility function, which depends upon whether she chooses to continue working in period 2, is given by

$$U_2 = \begin{cases} \beta p(e_1) & \text{if judge discontinues work} \\ -c(e_2) + \beta p(e_1 + e_2) & \text{if judge continues work} \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

9.2.1 Time-Consistent Judge

First we consider a time-consistent judge. For a time-consistent agent, $\beta = 1$, which reflects an absence of present-bias. Since a time-consistent judge's preferences do not change over time, she is able to commit to whichever future course of action maximizes U_1 . She continues working in the second period if $-c(e_1^*) - c(e_2^*) + \beta p(e_1^* + e_2^*) > -c(\tilde{e}_1) + p(\tilde{e}_1)$, where $\{e_1^*, e_2^*\} = \arg \max_{e_1, e_2} -c(e_1) + p(e_1), -c(e_1) - c(e_2) + p(e_1 + e_2)$ and $\{\tilde{e}_1\} = \arg \max_{e_1} -c(e_1) + \beta p(e_1)$. Assuming that she continues working into the second period, the judge's optimal sequence of effort is characterized by the first-order conditions

$$c'(e_1) = c'(e_2) = p(e_1 + e_2). \quad (12)$$

That is, the judge invests the same in both periods. Moreover, due to the convexity of the cost curve, it can be shown that the judge will always prefer to continue working after the first period so that she may smooth her effort across two periods.

9.2.2 Present-Biased Judge

Next we consider a present-biased judge. We will assume for sake of simplicity that the judge is naive to her time-inconsistent preferences; the main results extend to the case of a

sophisticated judge. The severity of the judge's present-bias is reflected by $\beta \in (0, 1]$.

In the first period, the naive agent chooses her actual first-period effort e_1^* and her planned second-period effort \hat{e}_2^* in order to maximize U_1 . She continues working after the first period if $-c(e_1^*) - \beta c(\hat{e}_2^*) + \beta p(e_1^* + \hat{e}_2^*) > -c(\tilde{e}_1) + p(\tilde{e}_1)$. The naive judge will always choose to continue working in the second period due to both the convexity of the cost function and the perceived lower cost of effort in the second period. Actual first-period effort e_1^* and planned second-period effort \hat{e}_2^* are characterized by the first order conditions

$$\begin{aligned} c'(e_1^*) &= \beta g'(e_1^* + \hat{e}_2^*) \\ c'(\hat{e}_2^*) &= p'(e_1^* + \hat{e}_2^*). \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

In the second period the judge is surprised to learn that her current effort is no less costly than it was in the previous period. The judge therefore re-optimizes in the second period, with her actual second-period effort e_2^* being characterized by

$$c'(e_2^*) = \beta p'(e_1^* + e_2^*). \tag{14}$$

Comparing equations

9.2.3 Implementing the Six-Month List

Next I will modify my model to incorporate a policy like the six-month list. Before the imposition of the six-month list, a judge's probability of promotion depended only upon the effort she exerted plus a random noise term.

$$p(e_1, e_2) = \begin{cases} g(e_1 + \epsilon) \\ g(e_1 + e_2 + \epsilon) - B, \end{cases} \tag{15}$$

where $g(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing and concave in effort e and the constant B reflects a punishment for judges whose motions appear on the six-month list. In other words, a judge is free to continue working in the second period if she chooses, but the cost of doing so is a predictably lower probability of future promotion.

Proposition: For a naive or sophisticated present-biased judge, \exists incentive B such that a non-complying judge (who continues working in the second period) becomes a complying

judge (who concludes work in period one).

Proposition: For a naive or sophisticated present-biased judge, total effort is weakly decreasing with compliance.

Proposition: For a naive or sophisticated present-biased judge, for a given incentive B , compliance with the six-month list is increasing in the variance of ϵ .

9.3 Additional Tables & Figures

Figure 11: Excerpt from the CJRA six-month report for the period ending September 30, 2016


CJRA Table 8—Report Of Motions Pending Over Six Months
For Period Ending September 30, 2016

DC Circuit

District Judge BATES, JOHN D.

Office	Docket Number	NOS Code	Case Title	Motion Text	CJRA Deadline	Status	Status Description
1	15-cv-01945	360	OWENS et al v. BNP PARIBAS S.A. et al	MOTION to Dismiss	08/30/2016	B	Opinion/Decision in Draft
						Q	Complexity of Case
				MOTION for Summary Judgment	09/03/2016	B	Opinion/Decision in Draft
						Q	Complexity of Case

Figure 12: Distribution of Case Types



Category “Other” includes miscellaneous statutory claims, tax-related claims, certain employment rights claims, as well as a wide variety of other case types.

Table 10: Effect of Reporting Time on Months Until Motion Disposition
Individual Reporting Month Dummies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
8-9 Months Reporting Time	0.213*** (0.029)	0.114*** (0.042)	0.137*** (0.041)	0.138*** (0.049)
9-10 Months Reporting Time	0.365*** (0.029)	0.479*** (0.043)	0.487*** (0.043)	0.486*** (0.049)
10-11 Months Reporting Time	0.483*** (0.029)	0.504*** (0.032)	0.517*** (0.032)	0.517*** (0.032)
11-12 Months Reporting Time	0.639*** (0.030)	0.557*** (0.044)	0.573*** (0.044)	0.575*** (0.051)
12-13 Months Reporting Time	0.633*** (0.030)	0.736*** (0.042)	0.726*** (0.042)	0.724*** (0.049)
Observations	206,187	206,187	206,151	206,151
Case & Motion Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar Trends		Yes	Yes	Yes
District*Year FEs			Yes	Yes
Day-of-Month FEs				Yes
Mean of Dep. Variable	5.36	5.36	5.36	5.36
Mean of Indep. Var	10.03	10.03	10.03	10.03

This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of additional reporting time on months until motion disposition. Reporting time is measured in the number of months between the day on which a motion was filed and the earliest possible date on which it could appear on a CJRA 6-month report. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Table 11: Effect of Reporting Time on Months Until Case Disposition
Individual Reporting Month Dummies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
8-9 Months Reporting Time	0.050 (0.109)	-0.128 (0.146)	-0.115 (0.145)	0.061 (0.170)
9-10 Months Reporting Time	0.027 (0.107)	0.372** (0.149)	0.416*** (0.148)	0.244 (0.167)
10-11 Months Reporting Time	0.116 (0.109)	0.289** (0.117)	0.312*** (0.116)	0.301*** (0.116)
11-12 Months Reporting Time	0.389*** (0.108)	0.367** (0.154)	0.367** (0.153)	0.522*** (0.175)
12-13 Months Reporting Time	0.210** (0.107)	0.407*** (0.146)	0.457*** (0.145)	0.280* (0.167)
Observations	183923	183923	183887	183887
Case & Motion Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar Trends		Yes	Yes	Yes
District*Year FEs			Yes	Yes
Day-of-Month FEs				Yes
Mean of Dep. Variable	23.38	23.38	23.37	23.37
Mean of Indep. Var	10.04	10.04	10.04	10.04


This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of additional motion reporting time on months until overall case disposition. Reporting time is measured in the number of months between the day on which a motion was filed and the earliest possible date on which it could appear on a CJRA 6-month report. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Figure 13: Distribution of Covariates Across Filing Date Cutoffs




(a) % Motions filed by Plaintiff



(b) % Motions filed by Defendant



(c) % Employment Discrimination Cases



(d) % Social Security Cases

Appendix Tables 9.3 and 9.3 report the coefficients and standard errors corresponding to Appendix Figures 14a and 14b.

Table 12: Effect of Motion Reporting Time on Motion Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Motion Granted				
Months until Report	0.0009 [0.0006]	0.0013** [0.0006]	0.0013** [0.0006]	0.0015** [0.0006]
Observations	206,199	206,199	206,163	206,163
Mean of Dep. Variable	.48	.48	.48	.48
Motion Denied				
Months until Report	-0.0002 [0.0006]	-0.0004 [0.0006]	-0.0005 [0.0006]	-0.0003 [0.0006]
Observations	206,199	206,199	206,163	206,163
Mean of Dep. Variable	.36	.36	.36	.36
Motion Granted in Part				
Months until Report	-0.0002 [0.0004]	-0.0003 [0.0005]	-0.0003 [0.0005]	-0.0007 [0.0005]
Observations	206,199	206,199	206,163	206,163
Mean of Dep. Variable	.14	.14	.14	.14
Motion Decided in Favor of Defendant				
Months until Report	0.0008 [0.0006]	0.0011* [0.0007]	0.0012* [0.0007]	0.0015** [0.0007]
Observations	191,635	191,635	191,614	191,614
Mean of Dep. Variable	.57	.57	.57	.57
Motion Decided in Favor of Plaintiff				
Months until Report	-0.0003 [0.0006]	-0.0004 [0.0006]	-0.0006 [0.0006]	-0.0005 [0.0006]
Observations	191,635	191,635	191,614	191,614
Mean of Dep. Variable	.28	.28	.28	.28
Case & Motion Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar Trends		Yes	Yes	Yes
District*Year FEs			Yes	Yes
Day-of-Month FEs				Yes
Mean of Dep. Variable	.48	.48	.48	.48
Mean of Indep. Var	10.03	10.03	10.03	10.03

This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of additional reporting time on the probabilities of various motion outcomes. Reporting time is measured in the number of months between the day on which a motion was filed and the earliest possible date on which it could appear on a CJRA 6-month report. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: Effect of Motion Reporting Time on Appellate Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Appeal Filed				
Months until Report	0.0000 [0.0003]	-0.0000 [0.0003]	0.0005 [0.0006]	0.0005 [0.0006]
Observations	480,534	480,534	206,163	206,163
Mean of Dep. Variable	.22	.22	.26	.26
Affirmed on Appeal				
Months until Report	0.0011 [0.0009]	0.0011 [0.0009]	0.0026** [0.0013]	0.0028** [0.0013]
Observations	106,202	106,202	53,755	53,755
Mean of Dep. Variable	.48	.48	.51	.51
Reversed on Appeal				
Months until Report	-0.0010* [0.0005]	-0.0011* [0.0005]	-0.0007 [0.0007]	-0.0008 [0.0007]
Observations	106,202	106,202	53,755	53,755
Mean of Dep. Variable	.10	.10	.08	.08
Case & Motion Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Calendar Trends		Yes	Yes	Yes
District*Year FEs			Yes	Yes
Day-of-Month FEs				Yes
Motion Outcome Dummies			Yes	Yes
Mean of Dep. Variable	.48	.48	.48	.48
Mean of Indep. Var	10.03	10.03	10.03	10.03

This table presents OLS estimates of the effect of additional reporting time on the probabilities of various appellate outcomes. Reporting time is measured in the number of months between the day on which a motion was filed and the earliest possible date on which it could appear on a CJRA 6-month report. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) are unconditional on motion outcomes (i.e. whether the motion was granted, denied, granted in part, etc.), while columns (3) and (4) condition on motion outcome dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 14: Effect of Reporting Time on Months Until Disposition




Figure 15: Regression Discontinuity Plots of Motion and Appellate Outcomes




Table 14: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Effect of Reporting Time on Baseline Motion- and Case-Level Characteristics

	Parametric			Non-Parametric (Local Linear)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Linear	Quadratic	Cubic	IK Bandwidth	CCT Bandwidth
Motion Filed by Defendant					
Filed After Cutoff	0.000*** [0.000]	-0.000*** [0.000]	-0.000*** [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	0.000 [0.000]
Mean of Dep. Variable	.64	.64	.64	.65	.63
Observations	204,137	204,137	204,137	6,826	35,818
Motion Filed by Plaintiff					
Filed After Cutoff	0.001 [0.002]	0.001 [0.003]	0.003 [0.004]	0.013 [0.018]	0.010 [0.006]
Mean of Dep. Variable	.29	.29	.29	.28	.29
Observations	204,137	204,137	204,137	4,208	38,323
Motion Filed in Employment Discrimination Case					
Filed After Cutoff	0.000*** [0.000]	0.000*** [0.000]	-0.000*** [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]	0.000 [0.000]
Mean of Dep. Variable	.12	.12	.12	.14	.12
Observations	204,137	204,137	204,137	4,208	51,247
Motion Filed in Social Security Case					
Filed After Cutoff	-0.000*** [0.000]	-0.000*** [0.000]	0.000*** [0.000]	0.000 [0.000]	0.000 [0.000]
Mean of Dep. Variable	.12	.12	.12	.10	.12
Observations	204,137	204,137	204,137	4,208	42,764

This table presents regression discontinuity (RD) estimates of the effect of additional reporting time on baseline motion- and case-level characteristics, including whether the motion filed by the plaintiff vs. defendant, and whether the motion was filed in an employment discrimination or social security-related case. The running variable represents the motion filing date relative to the six-month list eligibility cutoff. Motions filed just before the cutoff are eligible for the current six month list, whereas motions filed just after the cutoff have an additional six months before they might appear on a list. Columns (1)-(3) are estimated parametrically with linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomials, respectively. Columns (4)-(5) are estimated nonparametrically with local linear regressions, using the IK and CCT methods of optimal bandwidth selection, respectively. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 15: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Effect of Reporting Time on Motion-Level Outcomes

	Parametric			Non-Parametric (Local Linear)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Linear	Quadratic	Cubic	IK Bandwidth	CCT Bandwidth
Motion Granted					
Filed After Cutoff	0.002 [0.005]	-0.002 [0.007]	-0.000 [0.009]	-0.046 [0.037]	-0.016 [0.014]
Mean of Dep. Variable	.48	.48	.48	.48	.47
Observations	204,137	204,137	204,137	6,826	35,818
Motion Denied					
Filed After Cutoff	0.000 [0.004]	0.001 [0.006]	-0.002 [0.008]	0.030 [0.033]	0.002 [0.013]
Mean of Dep. Variable	.36	.36	.36	.35	.36
Observations	204,137	204,137	204,137	6,826	44,864
Motion Granted in Part					
Filed After Cutoff	0.001 [0.003]	0.007 [0.005]	0.006 [0.007]	0.009 [0.032]	0.011 [0.010]
Mean of Dep. Variable	.14	.14	.14	.16	.14
Observations	204,137	204,137	204,137	4,208	57,360

This table presents regression discontinuity (RD) estimates of the effect of additional reporting time on motion-level outcomes, including whether the motion was granted, denied, or granted in part. The running variable represents the motion filing date relative to the six-month list eligibility cutoff. Motions filed just before the cutoff are eligible for the current six month list, whereas motions filed just after the cutoff have an additional six months before they might appear on a list. Columns (1)-(3) are estimated parametrically with linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomials, respectively. Columns (4)-(5) are estimated nonparametrically with local linear regressions, using the IK and CCT methods of optimal bandwidth selection, respectively. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 16: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Effect of Reporting Time on Appellate Outcomes

	Parametric		Non-Parametric (Local Linear)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Linear	Quadratic	Cubic	IK Bandwidth	CCT Bandwidth
Appeal Filed					
Filed After Cutoff	0.002 [0.004]	0.005 [0.006]	-0.004 [0.008]	-0.054* [0.029]	-0.020* [0.011]
Mean of Dep. Variable	.26	.26	.26	.26	.26
Observations	204,137	204,137	204,137	6,826	53,262
Affirmed on Appeal					
Filed After Cutoff	0.007 [0.009]	-0.004 [0.013]	0.027 [0.018]	-0.282*** [0.093]	0.007 [0.026]
Mean of Dep. Variable	.51	.51	.51	.5	.51
Observations	53,370	53,370	53,370	1,752	15,120
Reversed on Appeal					
Filed After Cutoff	-0.008 [0.005]	-0.001 [0.008]	-0.010 [0.010]	-0.049 [0.059]	-0.011 [0.014]
Mean of Dep. Variable	.08	.08	.08	.09	.09
Observations	53,370	53,370	53,370	1,077	15,120

This table presents regression discontinuity (RD) estimates of the effect of additional reporting time on various appellate outcomes, including whether an appeal was filed subsequent to an order on the motion, whether the lower-court judgment was affirmed on appeal, and whether the lower-court judgment was reversed. The running variable represents the motion filing date relative to the six-month list eligibility cutoff. Motions filed just before the cutoff are eligible for the current six month list, whereas motions filed just after the cutoff have an additional six months before they might appear on a list. Columns (1)-(3) are estimated parametrically with linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomials, respectively. Columns (4)-(5) are estimated nonparametrically with local linear regressions, using the IK and CCT methods of optimal bandwidth selection, respectively. All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including a dummy for the party (plaintiff or defendant) filing the motion and nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year fixed effects.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 17: Proportional Hazard Analysis: Effect of Reporting Time on Motion Survival

	(1)	(2)
8-9 Months until Report	0.980** [0.008]	0.946*** [0.010]
9-10 Months until Report	0.922*** [0.008]	0.900*** [0.010]
10-11 Months until Report	0.913*** [0.007]	0.847*** [0.009]
11-12 Months until Report	0.898*** [0.007]	0.798*** [0.008]
12-13 Months until Report	0.894*** [0.007]	0.808*** [0.008]
Observations	420,535	420,212
Survival Model	Cox	Cox
Stratified by NoS, Judge, District, & Filing-Year		Yes
Mean Months Motion Open	6.21	6.21
Mean Reporting Time (months)	10.05	10.05

This table presents hazard ratios for individual reporting month dummies (relative to a baseline hazard rate for motions with fewer than eight months of reporting time). All columns include basic case- and motion-level controls, including calendar day time trends, dummies for the moving party, and a dummy for whether previous summary judgment motions have been filed in the same case. Column (2) is also stratified to allow for independent baseline hazard rates by nature-of-suit, judge, district, and filing-year.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$